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Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective of 
Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to function 
more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and 
employment.
In the inflation targeting system, since August 2005 the Bank has sought to attain price stability by ensuring an inflation rate 
near the 3% medium-term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 
performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three months, in order to establish the 
monetary conditions consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration 
of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook, money and 
capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and to enhance transparency, the Bank 
publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Report presents the inflation 
forecasts prepared by the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial Analysis Departments, as well as the 
macroeconomic developments underlying these forecasts. The forecasts are based on certain assumptions. Hence, in 
producing its forecasts, the staff assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. In respect of economic variables 
exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by staff in the MNB’s Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial 
Analysis Departments and Financial Stability Departments under the general direction of Ágnes Csermely, Director. The 
project was managed by Barnabás Virág, Senior Economist of Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis, with the help of 
Mihály Hoffman and Péter Bauer. The Report was approved for publication by Ferenc Karvalits, Deputy Governor.
Primary contributors to this Report include: Judit Antal, Péter Bauer, Katalin Bodnár, Mihály Hoffmann, Ágnes Horváth, 
András Hudecz, Gábor Kiss, Zalán Kocsis, Balázs Krusper, Rita Lénárt-Odorán, Zsolt Lovas, Miklós Lukács, Ádám 
Martonosi, Benedek Nobilis, Gábor Pellényi, Olivér Miklós Rácz, Zoltán Reppa, István Schindler, Róbert Szemere, Béla 
Szörfi, Judit Várhegyi, Timea Várnai. Other contributors to the analyses and forecasts in this Report include various staff 
members of the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and the Financial Analysis Departments.
The Report incorporates valuable input from the Monetary Council’s comments and suggestions following its meetings on 
8th February and 22nd February 2010. The projections and policy considerations, however, reflect the views of staff in the 
Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and the Financial Analysis Departments and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Monetary Council or the MNB.
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The world economy has continued to recover and conditions in financial 
markets have improved since the November 2009 Quarterly Report on 
Inflation. Further improvement is expected over the entire forecast period, 
providing additional support for a recovery in the Hungarian economy. 
However, lending by domestic banks may remain extremely subdued throughout 
2010, amplifying the contractionary effects of inevitably pro-cyclical fiscal and 
monetary policy on aggregate demand, despite improving external conditions. 
The recovery in Hungary is likely to lag behind that of the global economy, 
largely reflecting the decline in domestic demand. The projection for the 
economy remains one of appreciable GDP growth from 2011.
The subdued demand environment continues to have a strong downward 
effect on prices, which may lead to an inflation rate that undershoots the 
medium-term target in 2011. The rise in unemployment to a historically high 
level is expected to exert an increasingly powerful disciplinary effect on wage 
decisions, which, in turn, is likely to support that process. At the same time, 
in the context of the global recovery, rising food and commodity prices and 
a slower decline in regulated prices may decelerate the disinflation process.
The heterogenous pattern of growth may lead to a further improvement in 
Hungary’s external balance. As was the case in 2009, this is likely to help the 
economy operate without the need to rely on substantial foreign funding in 
the coming years, following a period of rapid accumulation of external debt.
International investors have become more cautious in recent months, with the 
rise in risky asset prices slowing. The most important financial market 
measures of liquidity and risk remain at levels experienced in the months 
before Lehman Brothers’ failure. Nevertheless, these values are still worse 
than at the onset of the crisis in August 2007. But concerns over Greek 
government debt once again focused investor attention on the risks associated 
with the rapid accumulation of public sector debts and the sustainability of 
debt paths. Domestic financial market developments were driven mainly by 
shifts in global sentiment. Although the significant improvement in Hungary’s 
external balance has reduced the vulnerability of the economy, weak 
indicators of activity continue to pose downside risks.
The domestic financial intermediary system continues to show little sign of a 
pick-up in lending activity. Over the past quarter, the fall in the sector’s loan-
to-deposit ratio has slowed, suggesting that the balance sheet adjustment by 
banks may last longer than expected. Growth in lending has been hindered 
by both supply and demand factors. Falling domestic demand, rising 
unemployment, the high bankruptcy rate and increased costs of borrowing 
are working to restrain demand by companies and households. The 
contraction in the supply of credit has been reflected mainly in the tightening 
of non-price terms on loans to the corporate sector and in the tightening of 
price terms on loans to households. The turnaround in domestic lending 
activity, previously expected for early 2010, may not occur before the second 
half of the year, thus continuing to weigh on consumption and investment by 
the major domestic institutional sectors.
The more benign external environment 
is likely to help fuel the recovery in 
Hungary; however, the decline in 
domestic demand can be sharper and 
more prolonged than earlier expected
International investors appear to be 
taking a more cautious approach to risk
Domestic lending conditions remain 
tight; the expected turnaround in 
lending activity is likely to take longer to 
materialise
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Simultaneously with the process of real economic and financial market 
adjustment accompanying the recession, Hungary’s high current account 
deficit of the past few years had narrowed and moved to a significant surplus 
from the middle of 2009. The dramatic shift in the economy’s external 
balance was driven by an improvement in the balance on trade in goods and 
services. The contraction in demand combining with the improvement in the 
outlook for exports is likely to result permanently balanced current account 
over the entire forecast period. 
The global economic recovery, which started in the middle of 2009, continued 
over the past quarters. In most of the world’s developed economies the 
recession ended in Q3. Although output growth and confidence measures 
have continued to pick up in the most recent months, domestic demand has 
continued to show few signs of recovering. Accordingly, the positive shifts in 
GDP may have been related to one-off factors, such as the rebuilding of stocks 
and fiscal stimulus measures. Looking forward, the improvement in external 
demand may be slower than that observed in 2009 H2 as these temporary 
factors fade suggesting by the weak production and GDP data in the Eurozone 
at the end of 2009.
The benign external demand environment had a positive influence on the 
performance of the domestic export sector; however, this was only sufficient 
to slow the pace of decline in GDP up to 2009 Q3, due to declining domestic 
demand. The performance of Hungarian companies producing for the 
domestic market was significantly restrained by weak consumption and 
investment demand. Household consumption may be even lower than 
expected, especially this year, the major contributing factor being weaker 
lending activity over the entire forecast period. Meanwhile, companies have 
a large margin of spare capacity. Consequently, the sector is likely to respond 
to a gradual pick-up in demand by rising the use of existing assets rather than 
committing to additional investment projects. Accordingly, projects financed 
with EU funds are likely to be the only source of the expansion in whole-
economy investment.
The diverging trends in growth have increasingly been reflected in labour 
market developments. Earnings growth in the service sectors has eased from 
consistently high levels, while growth in manufacturing earnings has picked 
up steadily as foreign demand has bounced back. This trend may continue in 
2010. The increase in earnings growth in the services sector is only likely to 
catch up with manufacturing earnings growth in 2011, along with a recovery 
of domestic demand. The number of unemployed rose at a moderating pace 
in the final months of 2009. With the prospects for demand improving, 
companies are seeking to maintain employment at current levels, even when 
their production volumes are actually falling. Consistent with this, the pace 
of layoffs may slow further in 2010, followed by a slight rise in employment 
numbers in 2011. However, the unemployment rate may remain above pre-
crisis levels for quite a long while.
Inflation data in January of 2010 was higher than the Bank’s expectations. 
The rise in annual inflation was mainly driven by the increases in global 
commodity prices, the changes in excise taxes and higher than expected rise 
in food prices. In the case of industrial goods, the smaller than expected 
price-cuts in early this year might be attributed to a deviation of the 
The heterogenity in the pattern of 
growth has also been reflected in a 
significant, sustained improvement in 
the external balance
The recovery of Hungary’s major export 
markets is expected to be slow and 
gradual as the temporary effects wane 
Despite a more benign external 
environment, the sharp decline in 
domestic demand continues to impede 
recovery
The rise in the unemployment rate is 
slowing; however, employment is 
unlikely to increase materially in 2011
As the upward effects on the price level 
of the indirect tax increases wear off, 
inflation is likely to be downwards from 
the middle of the year 
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seasonality of sales actions from their levels in past years. The downward 
effects of the recessionary environment continued to be clearly reflected on 
private services prices supporting the longer term disinflation trend. The 
increase in excise taxes and a number of measures affecting administered 
prices early this year may hold the annual inflation around 6 percent in the 
short term; however, trend inflation, which is closely related to changes in 
macroeconomic fundamentals, may continue to moderate in 2010. With the 
waning of the base effects of last year’s indirect tax increases, the marked fall 
in inflation is likely to become evident in the annual indices from the middle 
of the year.
On balance, provided that the key assumptions underlying the projection 
hold (the most important of these are that (i) the central bank base rate is held 
constant at 6.00%; (ii) the forint exchange rate remains at EUR/HUF 269.3; 
and (iii) the price of crude oil moves around EUR 80–85 per barrel), 
Hungarian output is likely to continue falling in 2010. GDP growth is only 
expected to pick up strongly in 2011. Consequently, the recovery in Hungary 
is likely to lag behind that of developed economies and the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
With the waning of the base effects of last year’s indirect tax increases the 
consumer price inflation may fall close to the medium-term target from mid-
2010, while the headline inflation rate may undershoot the target from the 
beginning of next year. The upward revisions in our inflation forecast were 
mainly driven by the higher oil price assumptions, the rise in regulated prices 
and the change of the weights in consumer basket; however, subdued demand 
is likely to exert downward pressure on prices over the entire forecast period. 
In the current projection, a slower-than-expected recovery of external 
demand, a further need of fiscal adjustment affecting the 2011 government 
balance and a slower-than-expected adjustment of inflation expectations 
pose the most important risks. On the whole, in terms of inflation the balance 
of risks is slightly on the upside, while in terms of growth considerable 
downside risks point to slower growth.
In 2010 and 2011, the general government deficit as a percentage of GDP can 
only be reduced to below 4 per cent if the government’s stability reserves and 
interest reserves for contingencies are cancelled. However, further measures 
will be required to meet the fiscal target. It is important to note, however, 
that trend developments in the fiscal balance, adjusted for the effects of the 
economic cycle, remain downwards in the baseline projection.
From 2011 the headline inflation rate 
may undershoot the medium-term 
inflation target, although the slower 
adjustment in inflationary expectations 
may result risks on the upside
The budget deficit target is unlikely to 
be met unless further measures are 
taken
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Inflation projection fan chart
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GDP projection fan chart
(seasonally adjusted, reconciled data)
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Summary table of baseline scenario
(The forecasts are conditional: the baseline scenario represents the most probable scenario, which applies only if the assumptions 
presented in Chapter 3 materialise; unless otherwise indicated, it represents percentage changes on the previus year.)
1 From May 2009 on, calculated according to the joint methodology of the CSO and MNB. 
2 As a percentage of GDP.
3  The numbers in brackets refer to the deficit achievable in case of total blocking of budgetary reserves. In our forecast we have not taken into 
consideration any risk from debt assumptions. 
4 Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 
5 According to the CSO LFS data. 
6  According to the original CSO data for full-time employees. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the changed 
seasonality of bonuses. 
7 Private sector unit labour cost calculated with a wage index excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses. 
* Data are not adjusted for calendar effects.
** MNB estimate. 
2008 2009 2010 2011
Actual Projection
Inlation (annual average)
Core inflation1 5.2 4.1 3.2 1.3
Consumer price index 6.1 4.2 4.4 2.3
Economic growth
External demand (GDP based) 2.0 –4.4 1.1 2.1
Household consumption expenditure –0.5 –8.2 –3.9 2.7
Gross fixed capital formation 0.4 –7.0 1.8 5.0
Domestic absorption 0.7 –11.0 –1.6 2.9
Export 5.6 –9.5 5.8 9.0
Import 5.7 –15.3 4.7 8.8
GDP* 0.6 –6.3 –0.2 3.4
External balance2
Current account balance –7.2 0.4 –0.4 –0.4
External financing capacity –6.2 1.8 1.6 2.0
Government balance2
ESA balance3 –3.8 –4.0 –4.2 (–4.0) –4.3 (–4.1)
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 7.6 0.3 2.4 3.9
Whole-economy employment5 –1.2 –2.5 –0.8 0.1
Private sector gross average earnings6 8.5 (8.0) 4.3 3.6 3.9
Private sector employment5 –1.1 –3.7 –1.7 0.1
Unit labour costs in the private sector5, 7 5.4 8.3 –1.2 0.3
Household real income** –0.6 –5.1 –2.7 2.0

1 Evaluation of macro-economic data
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EVALUATION OF MACRO-ECONOMIC DATA
Hungarian economy still in recession in 
spite of an upswing in external demand
By mid-2009 the worst was over in international economic 
activity and recovery began in global economic processes. 
For the time being, the effect of the more benign external 
environment was reflected in the expansion of Hungarian 
exports. This, however, besides the further declining 
domestic demand, resulted in only a deceleration of the 
decline in Hungarian GDP. Factors determining the strong 
heterogeneity of the Hungarian GDP also might have an 
influence on the 2010 macroeconomic developments, and as 
a consequence, acceleration of Hungarian growth follows 
global trends with delay. 
The demand-boosting economic policy measures taken in 
developed economies stabilised the global economy in an 
adequate manner. An upturn in economic activity was 
observed already starting from the second half of last year. 
However, this was facilitated by one-off factors like the 
replenishment of corporate stocks and fiscal demand-
increasing measures (mainly car-scrapping schemes), and 
with their fading out global recovery may continue at a 
slower pace. Data on end-year production as well as fourth 
quarter GDP reinforce this: the economy of Germany and 
of the Euro zone was stagnating, while a decline was 
observed in the Czech Republic and in Romania. 
The extent and the structure of the decline in domestic 
GDP until end-2009 was slightly different than our previous 
expectations. Fourth quarter developments in GDP were 
more favourable than indicated in our November forecast, 
although according to the available information set, the 
difference between external and internal demand appears 
increasingly remarkable in domestic economic 
developments. In 2009 H2, the developments in external 
economic activity were more favourable than expected, and 
on the absorption side resulted in a substantial increase in 
exports. In parallel with this, an upswing in imports was 
also observed, which is mainly attributable to the relatively 
high import demand of exports, but filling up the gas 
storage capacities also played a role. Households’ 
consumption decisions continue to be influenced by the 
current and expected developments in income as well as the 
balance sheet adjustment that is a consequence of the crisis. 
Accordingly, households’ consumption expenditure 
declined considerably in 2009 H2 as well. Gross fixed 
capital formation was again characterised by an increasing 
decline in Q3, caused primarily by a significant fall in 
corporate and household investment.
With respect to the main economic sectors, the recovery in 
external markets mainly increased the value added in 
industry. Weak domestic demand was particularly reflected 
in the performance of market services – the decline is 
especially remarkable in the trade and tourism sector. With 
regard to the sectors where value added has a smaller 
weight, the correction of the outstanding year 2008 
continued in agriculture, while the value added in 
construction continued to decline, mainly as a result of a fall 
in building investment.
Chart 1-2
Contribution of the output of major sectors 
of the national economy to GDP growth*
(quarterly indices, based on seasonally adjusted data)
* The sum of the contributions to growth of the basic-price sectoral added 
values does not necessarily equal the market-price GDP. On the one hand, 
time series with chain-type indices are not additive, while, on the other, 
the balance of taxes on and subsidies to production (the difference between 
market- and basic-price value added) is not constant as a proportion of 
market-price GDP.
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Labour market developments continue to be determined by 
corporations’ adjustment to the unfavourable profit 
situation. Lay-offs continued to be typical of the competitive 
sector in the second half of the year, although their pace 
declined gradually. The slowdown in wage dynamics 
remained typical in the past quarters, but the sharp 
difference between external and domestic developments in 
demand also resulted in substantial differences in waging. 
Overall, in Q3 there was no further substantial deterioration 
in the competitive sector’s profit situation. 
The disinflationary effect of the weak demand was clearly 
reflected in corporations’ pricing decisions. Although as a 
result of indirect tax measures and global commodity price 
rises annual inflation gradually increased to over 6 per cent 
by early 2010, our trend inflation indicators suggested a 
continuation of the disinflation trend that had started in the 
middle of the year. Trend inflation characterising the 
economy amounted to around 2 per cent at end-2009.
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Starting from mid-2009, international economic activity 
took a turn as a result of economic policy incentives. The 
more benign economic environment became gradually 
reflected not only in confidence indicators, but also in 
production and, eventually, in GDP figures as well. 
Examining the structure of growth, it is obvious that the 
expansion in H2 was supported by significant one-off 
effects. These included the replenishment of corporate 
stocks and the car-scrapping schemes announced by several 
governments. As these effects fade out, recovery from the 
crisis may continue more slowly in 2010. Relevant signs 
have been seen in the developments in recent months. 
Import demand in the euro area declined in October and 
November, while the level of industrial production as well 
as new industrial orders stopped increasing. Data on Q4 
show that both the economy of the euro zone and Germany 
was stagnating, while output declined in some countries in 
the region. Although confidence indices have continued to 
improve in recent months, based on the historic relationship 
between the indices and economic developments, for the 
time being stagnation or slow recovery of production is 
more likely over the short term. 
1.1  Temporary effects facilitated the 
improvement in external business conditions
Chart 1-3
Changes in external demand conditions
(seasonally adjusted data)
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In order to attenuate the impacts of the international recession, many 
countries introduced car scrappage schemes, in which the 
replacement of old cars with new ones is subsidised by the 
government. These programmes contributed to the stabilisation of 
demand and the upturn in external economic activity since mid-2009. 
As a small, open economy, Hungary may also have benefited from 
these programmes, since vehicle exports amount to more than one 
fifth of Hungarian goods exports. In this Box we summarise the 
information available to date about the international effects of car 
scrappage programmes, and review the channels through which they 
may have affected Hungarian industrial production in 2009 and over 
our forecast period.
According to the data of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ 
Association (ACEA), 13 EU Member States introduced car scrappage 
schemes. The largest, German package offered a support of EUR 2500 
per car in a total value of EUR 5 billion, which was completely used 
between January and September 2009. The total value of subsidies 
provided by the other EU Member States may have amounted to 
another EUR 1–2 billion in 2009–2010. 
It was hoped that, in addition to long-term environmental benefits, these 
programmes would increase households’ demand and dampen the 
economic downturn in the short term. Firstly, the fluctuations of 
automotive production are stronger than those of GDP, thus the sector 
was particularly hard hit by the global recession unfolding at end-2008. 
Secondly, automotive industry plays a central role in the global economy. 
In addition to providing 5–15 per cent of manufacturing value added in a 
number of countries, the industry also has strong supplier relationships 
with other sectors. In the G7 countries, a 1 euro increase in value added in 
the vehicle industry creates demand for products worth 3 euros.1 Due to 
the high import content of car purchases and production, car scrappage 
schemes may have assisted the manufacturers of other countries as well. 
In most countries, car scrappage schemes only moderated the fall in 
new car sales in 2009, although sales increased remarkably in Germany 
Box 1-1: The effects of car scrappage schemes on domestic and European industrial production
1 Haugh, David–Mourougane, Annabelle–Chatal, Olivier (2010):‘The Automobile Industry in and Beyond the Crisis’, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, no. 745.
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Examining the developments in exports of the region, 
significant similarities can be observed. The narrowing of 
export markets affected all economies of the region to a 
nearly identical extent. At the outset of the crisis a decline 
in export market share had been a general reaction. Then, 
starting from the middle of the year, in accordance with the 
recovery in external economic activity, which was mainly 
attributable to the car-scrapping programmes, export 
growth already exceeded the expansion of external demand. 
This was facilitated by the fact that by 2009 H2 real 
and France. The decline in car imports was even more explicit, because 
dealers depleted their stocks first. In the EU15 countries new 
registrations increased by 1 per cent, while vehicle imports fell by 23 per 
cent in euro terms (including trade among the EU15 countries). 
The developments in export market shares indicate that Hungarian and 
Slovak automotive companies were less able to benefit from car-
scrapping schemes than Czech or Polish ones. Compared to 2008, in the 
first three quarters of 2009 the share of Hungarian vehicle exports in the 
EU15 market declined by 9.5 per cent. The main underlying explanation 
may be that the car scrappage programmes primarily boosted the 
demand for smaller cars, which are typically manufactured in Czech, 
Polish and Romanian factories. The picture is more heterogeneous in 
parts manufacturing, depending on the car brands individual companies 
supply. 
In addition, the car scrappage schemes may also affect developments in 
economic activity through various indirect channels. Firstly, the increase 
in car purchases in 2009 took place at the expense of other consumption 
items. Moreover, car purchases further reduced households’ net savings. 
This may hinder current and future demand for other products. 
Secondly, consumers may have brought forward their future car 
purchases to receive the state subsidies. Furthermore, the replacement 
of used cars reduced the average age of vehicle stocks, which reduces 
future demand for replacement.2 Finally, according to OECD calculations 
the European automotive industry has significant excess capacity, 
therefore the sector’s investment activity may remain subdued in the 
medium term.
Based on market shares, Hungarian companies presumably enjoyed 
fewer benefits from the demand-increasing effect of the car scrappage 
schemes in 2009. However, if the loss of market shares is temporary, 
Hungary’s market share may return to the pre-crisis level as the 
programmes come to an end. Accordingly, Hungarian vehicle 
manufacturing, and through that the entire industry, may even 
overperform compared to other countries of the region. Nevertheless, 
the repercussions of the programmes may reduce the demand for cars, 
which can slow down the recovery of the automotive industry all over 
Europe. This, in turn, may have an adverse effect on the dynamics of 
industrial production as a whole.
Chart 1-4
Registrations of newly purchased cars in Europe*
G
er
m
an
y
(2
1.
6%
)
It
al
y
(1
5.
1%
)
U
K
(1
4.
9%
)
Fr
an
ce
(1
4.
3%
)
Sp
ai
n
(8
.1
%
)
E
U
27
2007 2008 2009
–30
–25
–20
–15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Annual change(%)
Without France
and Germany
* The percentages in brackets show countries’ shares of new car 
registrations in the EU27 in 2008.
Source: www.acea.be.
Chart 1-5
Export market shares of regional economies on 
the vehicle market of the EU15*
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exchange rates stabilised at a more depreciated level 
compared to year 2008. The exception is Slovakia, where 
due to the fixed nominal exchange rate similar shifts have 
not yet been observed.
Despite the similarities observed in export developments, 
already substantial differences can be observed in the 
growth paths typical from the middle of the year. The main 
underlying reason is the differences in households’ 
behaviour. In the countries introducing fiscal tightening in 
the crisis period and showing rapid indebtedness and asset 
price increase preceding the crisis, the adjustment of 
households’ balance sheets is taking place more vigorously. 
Accordingly, the significant decline in consumption in 
Hungary and Romania resulted in a fall in GDP, even in 
2009 Q3 and Q4. 
As a result of the turn in global economic activity and with 
growth prospects becoming more favourable, global 
commodity prices – except food – already demonstrated a 
notable increase in 2009 H2. For the time being, the 
demand created by the catching-up – typically Asian – 
countries, which are experiencing more rapid dynamism, 
may exert continuous upward pressure on commodity 
prices. This may only slightly be attenuated by the historically 
high level of inventories and storage capacities built up in 
developed countries. Based on futures prices, commodity 
price increases may continue in the coming quarters as well, 
causing a strengthening cost-push in domestic inflation in 
the short run.
Chart 1-6
External demand and exports in the region
(seasonally adjusted data)
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Chart 1-7
Contribution of final use items to annual changes in 
GDP in the region
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Chart 1-8
Developments in global commodity prices
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Ja
n.
 0
0
Ju
ly
 0
0
Ja
n.
 0
1
Ju
ly
 0
1
Ja
n.
 0
2
Ju
ly
 0
2
Ja
n.
 0
3
Ju
ly
 0
3
Ja
n.
 0
4
Ju
ly
 0
4
Ja
n.
 0
5
Ju
ly
 0
5
Ja
n.
 0
6
Ju
ly
 0
6
Ja
n.
 0
7
Ju
ly
 0
7
Ja
n.
 0
8
Ju
ly
 0
8
Ja
n.
 0
9
Ju
ly
 0
9
Ja
n.
 1
0
2000=100
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
2000=100
Food Metal All commodity Petroleum
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • FEBRUARY 201020
Although international economic activity already showed 
signs of recovery in 2009 H2, the output of the Hungarian 
economy continued to decline until the end of 2009 – 
although at a slower pace. Therefore, the upturn in the 
Hungarian economy is following the developed countries 
and the countries of the region with a delay. The main 
underlying reason is the weak domestic demand resulting 
from the balance sheet adjustments that are unavoidable 
with the inevitable pro-cyclical economic policy and the 
significant debt outstanding. 
As a result of the upturn in demand and following five 
quarters of decline, the value added of industry increased 
again. This upswing mainly stemmed from manufacturing 
export sales, but domestic sales stabilised as well. In the past 
quarters, within manufacturing production it was the 
automotive industry, which had suffered the heaviest losses 
in the crisis period, that benefited most from the recovery in 
the external environment, as a result of the car-scrapping 
schemes introduced in the EU. In December, however, 
output declined in a wide range of sectors. However, 
because of end-year temporary shut down of production 
plants, December data generally involve more uncertainty. 
The fact that a decline in production was observed in most 
European economies calls attention to the fragility of the 
global economic upturn. Confidence indices (Ifo, Zew) 
indicate a more restrained expansion of international, 
especially German, economic activity in the coming months, 
which is also reflected in the halt of new industrial orders in 
Germany in recent months. The slower recovery of external 
demand, compared to 2009 H2, may also have a similar 
effect on developments in domestic industrial production. 
Within market services, the decline in the trade and tourism 
sector was especially remarkable, which is mainly explained 
by weak household consumption. The relatively slighter fall 
in the transport and telecommunication sector may be 
attributable to the demand for goods supply created by the 
recovering industry and foreign trade. In spite of the 
extremely subdued domestic lending activity, the value 
added of the Hungarian financial intermediary system 
increased perceptibly in 2009 as well, which is unparalleled 
in the region. 
Of the sectors that have a lower weight in value added, the 
correction following the exceptional production of 2008 
continued in agriculture. Although government investment 
1.2  Recovering external economic activity 
attenuated the decline in domestic GDP
Chart 1-9
Contributions of the main final use items to changes 
in GDP
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in infrastructure, which was mainly financed from EU 
sources, attenuated the effect of the declining building 
investment, the value added of the construction industry 
continued to decline in the second half of the year. 
On the absorption side of GDP, in 2009 H2 households’ 
consumption expenditure might have declined even stronger 
than we had expected. Compared to the peak in 2007, the 
consumption rate of the household sector declined by 
approximately 5 percentage points until Q3. According to 
international crisis experiences, households’ consumption 
behaviour changes significantly in crisis periods. Balance 
sheet adjustment of the sector is a several-year process, at 
the end of which the consumption of households may be as 
much as 10–13 per cent below the trend typical before the 
crisis3. For the time being, domestic data are broadly in line 
with these experiences. 
However, we have not yet experienced any signs of a turn in 
the consumption path. Retail sales were indicating 
continuous deterioration in consumption in the last months 
of 2009. In addition to the unfavourable consumption 
figures, the sector’s financial savings were also somewhat 
below our expectations, which suggests a lower than 
expected level of income. Moreover, the effect of the 
lending activity of the banking sector may have played an 
even more decisive role in the developments in consumption. 
Earlier we had expected a stagnation in lending activity in 
2009 (i.e. the amount of new loans to be equal to the 
repayment in the given quarter). This assumption had 
proven to be true in the first half of the year, but in the 
second half – and particularly in the last months – we 
observed less favourable data than expected. The 
deterioration in lending was influenced by both demand-
side and supply-side factors. On the supply side the higher 
risk-aversion of the bank sector may play a dominant role, 
while on the demand side the weak current income situation 
and the strengthened precautionary motive in the 
consumption-savings behaviour of households can be 
relevant.
The narrowing of lending covered not only the loans 
extended by the banking sector, but also the activity of 
financial enterprises, thus households faced a lending 
environment that was much less benign than our forecasts. 
The shift in lending activity projected for early 2010 may 
even be postponed to the second half of the year; therefore, 
no major shift in consumption expenditure is expected for 
early 2010.
Gross fixed capital formation, the structure of which 
continues to be heterogeneous, was again characterised by 
a deepening decline in Q3. Machinery investment of the 
corporate sector declined significantly, while construction 
investment fell only slightly, due to infrastructural 
investment related to the public sector. The decline in total 
economy investment performance was greater than in the 
previous quarters, which may primarily be explained by 
Chart 1-11
Household consumption expenditure and the 
consumption trend preceding the crisis*
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Chart 1-12
Consumption expenditure and retail sales 
(annual index, volume)
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the fall in housing investment of the household sector. In 
parallel with the improvement in external economic 
activity, the capacity utilisation of the corporate sector 
seems to be moving from the bottom it hit in early 2009, 
although it remains historically very low. As a result of the 
protracted recovery surrounded by substantial 
uncertainties, corporate investment may remain subdued 
in the short term, while a further decline in household 
investment may be caused by the aforementioned tightening 
in the lending environment. At the beginning of 2010 as 
well, an upswing in activity can only be expected in 
investment funded from EU sources.   
The Central Statistical Office issued its latest National Accounts 
publication containing the comparative data for the period between 
1995 and 2007 in November 2009. The February issue of the Quarterly 
Report on Inflation has already been compiled on the revised information 
base; the most important changes concerning GDP statistics are 
presented below.4
The current publication contains more innovations and more important 
ones than usual. The experts of the Statistical Office made corrections 
on two sections of the time series. The period between 2000 and 2007 
had already been considered methodologically homogeneous earlier as 
well; therefore, only the developments requested by Eurostat were 
carried out for this period. The most important change was the 
accounting of inventory holding gain/loss.
For the period between 1995 and 1999 more substantial changes were 
made. The methodological developments introduced in recent years 
were referred to the period preceding the base year of 2000 in a 
consistent manner, making the time series between 1995 and 2007 
comparable. A total 31 various methodological changes were 
introduced, three of which affected the level and changes in volume of 
the gross domestic product significantly. The level of GDP was primarily 
increased by the inclusion of illegal activities and the application of the 
new FISIM (Financial Intermediary Services Indirectly Measured) 
methodology. The changeover from the earlier base indexing to chain 
indexing resulted in a major change in volume indices.
In addition to the National Accounts publication, the usual revision of 
annual and quarterly data for 2008 was also carried out, which resulted 
in the most significant changes in the year 2008 figures.
Box 1-2: Revision of CSO national account’s data
Household final 
consumption 
expenditure
Actual final 
consumption of 
government
Gross fixed capital 
formation
Exports Imports GDP
Revision before after before after before after before after before after before after
1996 –3.8 –3.5 –4.2 –3.5 6.8 3.8 12.0 11.1 9.4 9.1 1.3 1.0
1997 1.9 1.6 5.7 0.1 9.2 6.5 22.4 20.9 23.1 22.3 4.6 4.3
1998 4.4 4.3 –0.3 0.5 13.2 11.5 17.6 16.5 23.8 22.9 4.9 5.2
1999 5.6 6.4 1.8 2.8 5.9 6.0 12.3 11.1 13.3 12.3 4.2 4.2
2000 5.5 4.1 1.2 0.2 7.7 7.2 22.0 19.7 20.3 18.0 5.2 4.9
2001 6.4 6.6 0.9 0.9 4.7 4.7 8.1 8.1 5.3 5.3 4.1 4.1
2002 10.7 10.8 5.5 5.5 10.4 10.5 3.9 3.9 6.8 6.8 4.4 4.4
2003 8.3 8.4 4.1 4.1 2.2 2.1 6.2 6.2 9.3 9.3 4.3 4.3
2004 2.5 3.0 –0.1 –0.1 7.9 7.9 15.0 15.0 13.7 13.7 4.7 4.9
2005 3.4 3.2 –0.1 –0.1 5.8 5.7 11.3 11.3 7.0 7.0 3.9 3.5
2006 1.9 1.9 4.9 4.9 –3.7 –3.6 18.6 18.6 14.8 14.8 4.0 4.0
2007 0.5 0.3 –4.5 –4.3 1.8 1.6 16.4 16.2 13.4 13.3 1.2 1.0
2008 –0.5 –0.5 –1.9 –0.3 –2.6 0.4 4.8 5.6 4.7 5.7 0.6 0.6
Table 1-1
Changes in the final use of GDP
4  A detailed description of the changes is downloadable from the website of the CSO, from page 1303 of the publication entitled National Accounts of Hungary, 
1995–2007. http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/monsz/monsz9507.pdf.
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The correction of the depletion of stocks experienced in 
2009 H1 as a reaction to the crisis started in the second half 
of the year. Accordingly, an increase took place mainly in 
the inventories of the trading sector. In the short term, we 
expect this process to continue and presume a further 
positive adjustment in the level of inventories. 
While in Q2 the weak performance of the competitive 
sector was somewhat offset by the favourable contribution 
of the public sector, government consumption expenditure 
fell again in Q3, which may be attributable to further cost-
saving measures.
As a result of the benign external demand, net exports made 
a positive contribution to GDP growth in the second half of 
the year. This was primarily a result of the higher than 
expected increase in exports, although stemming from the 
high import demand of exports, growth in imports also 
exceeded expectations. The strengthening of the gas import 
in H2 also contributed to this process: due to the decline in 
A comparison of the volume indices of the final use of GDP shows that 
while the period between 1995 and 1999 underwent significant 
changes, the time series between 2000 and 2007 changed only slightly, 
some tenths of a percentage point. Overall, the application of the 
methodological changes did not have a significant effect on the level of 
GDP.
Year 2008, however, reveals major subsequent revisions. A restructuring 
took place mainly in the internal structure of the final use of gross 
domestic product; there was no substantial revision of GDP as a whole. 
The level of household consumption and, to a lesser extent, that of 
public consumption increased, while transfers from the state declined. 
With regard to other components of domestic use, the level of gross 
fixed capital formation also rose markedly. However, total domestic use 
still did not change so significantly, because the inventory and statistical 
errors items together offset more than half of the change. The levels of 
exports and imports also became much higher, but on the whole net 
exports declined.
Chart 1-13
Capacity utilisation in manufacturing
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Chart 1-14
Developments in whole-economy inventories
(quarterly change in inventories at current prices)
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prices during the year foreseen by importers, the seasonality 
of the gas import was not as usual. Moreover, filling up the 
newly created gas storage capacities also started. The 
improvement observed in the balance of services in 2009 
took place while imports were declining more strongly than 
exports. The export of services related to shopping tourism 
improved the balance of tourism mainly in the first half of 
last year, while domestic households’ trips abroad may have 
declined due to more subdued incomes and a more devalued 
forint exchange rate in 2009 H2.
In recent months, foreign trade prices were characterised by 
increasing euro-based export prices and stagnating import 
prices; consequently, the terms of trade improved gradually 
in H2. It is also true, however, that the level of the annual 
change is entirely attributable to developments in the prices 
of energy. 
Chart 1-15
The value of foreign trade in goods and the balance 
of trade in goods
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In H2 as well, the behaviour of companies was determined 
by stabilisation of the profit situation, which had deteriorated 
significantly as a result of the crisis. The pace of lay-offs 
already slowed down in the last months of the year, while 
examining the competitive sector as a whole, a further 
deceleration in wage dynamics was observed.
Significant differences can be observed in the developments 
in gross average earnings across sectors. Rapid wage 
adjustment was seen in manufacturing at the onset of the 
crisis, then, as a result of the improving external economic 
activity and in line with the increase in hours worked, wage 
dynamics picked up in H2. However, since early 2009 there 
has not been any major increase in wages in market services, 
which are more sensitive to the developments in domestic 
demand and which demonstrated a permanently rapid 
increase in wages earlier. The National Council for the 
Reconciliation of Interests recommended the preservation of 
the purchasing value of net earnings for 2010, which, 
according to our forecast, may be consistent with an 
approximately 1.5 per cent increase in gross average 
earnings. Although according to our experience – as opposed 
to the agreements on gross wages – the recommendations 
regarding the net real wage had less coordinating power in 
the wage decisions of the competitive sector in the past, the 
proposal based on the current very low gross wage may 
indicate the stabilisation of the more subdued pace of wage 
increase. Subdued wage increases by companies are also 
reflected in the findings of the survey of the Hay Group 
conducted in December 2009.5
Although the number of employees in the competitive sector 
continued to decline significantly in 2009 Q3, the pace of 
downsizing has already decelerated in recent months. In 2009 
as a whole, the fall in the number of employees in the 
competitive sector was moderate compared to the loss in 
output; consequently, labour productivity declined. This 
indicates that companies have responded to the decline in 
demand with only limited lay-offs, particularly since mid-
2009, when the prospects already improved gradually, and 
they keep part of the labour, especially the skilled employees 
that are difficult to replace, in reserve (labour hoarding). This 
was reflected in a significant increase in the ratio of part-time 
employees in H1, as well as in the decline in the hours worked 
by full-time employees and in a fall in overtime. In H2 there 
seems to be a shift in both indicators in manufacturing, which 
is related to the more favourable external economic activity. 
1.3  As a result of labour market adjustment, 
corporations’ profit situation did not continue to 
deteriorate
Chart 1-16
Wage developments in the competitive sector
(annual index, seasonally adjusted data)
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Chart 1-17
Increase in regular wages in the market services 
sector
(cumulated change from previous December)
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5  According to the survey, just 60% of the companies questioned modified wages in 2009; the average pay rise of all the companies amounted to 2.4%. The pay rise 
envisaged for 2010 is 3.2%; nearly 60% of the companies intend to modify wages.
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In 2009 Q3, the output of the private sector, excluding agriculture, 
declined by 8.3 per cent compared to the same period of the previous 
year, while employment declined to a lesser extent, by 6.2 per cent. 
Consequently, per capita productivity fell by approximately 2 per cent. 
Deterioration in productivity was typical in most European countries in 
the crisis period (Chart 1-18).
Of course, the deterioration does not result from a decline in technological 
development, but from a lower utilisation of the labour kept by 
companies, i.e. employers retain more employees than they would need 
over the longer term to produce the output of the given period. Labour 
hoarding is mainly attributable to the fact that searching for, training and 
dismissing suitable labour force and reorganising production is a time-
consuming activity entailing significant costs for companies.
The magnitude of labour hoarding may be affected not only by the 
costs of adjustment, but also by companies’ expectations. In the event 
that future developments in demand are surrounded by high 
uncertainties, companies may tend to wait with their adjustment 
decisions, while if they consider the shock to demand to be only 
temporary, very often they may believe that adjustment is not necessary. 
However, quantifying the effect of expectations raises particularly many 
problems in models. 
Lower capacity utilisation is reflected in the lower per capita number of 
hours worked (in the introduction of four-day working weeks in some 
cases) or simply in a decline in the amount of work to be done during 
working hours. The necessity of adjusting the number of employees 
may significantly be reduced – and increasing the scope for action and 
competitiveness of a company may, of course, facilitate a turnaround – 
if employees are willing to accept a reduction of their earnings, causing 
the profitability of companies to decline only to a lesser extent while 
excess capacities are maintained. In the case of hourly wages or 
performance-based waging this adjustment takes place partly 
automatically.
In addition to our forecast for the number of employees in the 
competitive sector, Chart 1-19 shows how many employees would be 
needed in the case of an equilibrium capacity utilisation to produce 
the value added of the given quarter.6 It can be seen that employment 
adjusted itself to the decline in demand relatively quickly in the first 
year of the crisis. Towards the end of the year, however, although the 
number of employees still exceeded the equilibrium value, the pace of 
lay-offs decelerated significantly, and we believe that this slower pace 
may remain typical in the future as well. The underlying reason is that, 
while during the initial adjustment many may have been of the 
opinion that one must get prepared for a fall in demand that lasts for 
years, recently, with the approach of the expected turn and with 
Box 1-3: Labour hoarding during the crisis
Chart 1-19
Employment and necessary employment at 
equilibrium capacity utilisation in the private 
sector
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6  This latter value is based on the NEM (Quarterly Forecasting Model) estimate. According to the approach applied in the model, production is the function of the 
amount of the available (private and state-owned) capital, the number of employees, the level of technological development and capacity utilisation. Fixing all the 
other variables, the value of any factor can be determined. The above indicator is the value received as a result for employment if the level of production, capital, 
development and capital utilisation are fixed at the current level, while the magnitude of labour utilisation is fixed at the equilibrium level.
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The monthly magnitude of mass lay-offs continued to 
decline in recent months, and was close to the levels typical 
before the crisis. Accordingly, we may continue to expect a 
fall in employment over the short run, although the intensity 
of lay-offs will decline steadily. In line with the expected 
developments in demand, employment processes that are 
heterogeneous at sectoral level may remain typical in the 
coming quarters as well. This is indicated by the employment-
related sub-components of the ESI indicator. In recent 
months the sub-index relating to expectations has been 
improving only in industry, while it has halted in the case of 
services. 
The number of employees declined to a lesser extent in the 
total economy, the underlying reason for which is the 
increase in public sector employees within the framework of 
the government’s ‘Pathways to Work’ programme. 
EVALUATION OF MACRO-ECONOMIC DATA
employment closer to the equilibrium, it may already be worthwhile 
for more companies to keep their employees with a temporarily lower 
workload.
Maintaining higher than equilibrium employment also means that 
following the upswing the dynamics of employment growth may also 
lag behind what would stem from the equilibrium, as companies will 
start to increase the number of their employees only after being able to 
supply the retained labour with work. Consequently, employment 
could increase only after the utilisation of the labour capacities kept on 
reserve by companies has reached the equilibrium value. The chart, 
however, shows that in our forecast we expect some slight increase 
earlier than that.
The underlying reason is that in our opinion the magnitudes of labour 
hoarding may be different depending on the features of individual 
companies’ and jobs. Therefore, labour hoarding may be more typical of 
jobs that require more specific knowledge and in the case of small 
enterprises capable of more flexible adjustment in terms of wages and 
intensity of work. Accordingly, while labour hoarding continues to be 
typical of some areas, in other areas even capacity expansion may 
become necessary.
Chart 1-20
Changes in the number of whole-economy 
employees
(based on LFS statistics, quarterly changes, seasonally adjusted data)
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Chart 1-21
Expectations regarding changes in employment 
according to the ESI indicator
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Chart 1-22
 Unit labour cost in the competitive sector
(annual change, seasonally adjusted data)
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Nevertheless, the unemployment rate increased to above 10 
per cent in Q3. The unemployment rate may continue to 
grow this year, although at a slower pace than earlier. 
In line with labour market developments, the dynamics of 
the unit labour cost, which had been extremely high earlier, 
already moderated in Q3, both in the competitive sector as 
a whole and in the major subsectors.
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Consumer inflation, which had grown to a level of around 
5 per cent as a result of the mid-year indirect tax measures, 
exceeded 6 per cent in January 2010. However, the 
unfavourable economic environment continues to have a 
substantial price-reducing effect. Accordingly, inflation 
trend indicators still reflect a historically low inflation 
environment. 
Of the most important items determining core inflation, the 
inflation of industrial products and the services sector was 
stable until the last quarter of 2009. Among market services, 
last year’s disinflation tendency continued in January, while 
we observed stronger-than-expected annual price rises in 
the case of industrial products. Pricing in the services sector 
shows strong seasonality in the first months of the year; this 
means that pricing decisions in the sector are made in the 
first months of the year. Given that the level of price 
increases early this year lagged considerably behind those 
seen in past years, and assuming the generally observed 
seasonality of pricing decisions, we expect a continuing 
disinflationary process in the sector. In the case of industrial 
goods, the smaller than expected price-cuts in early this 
year might be attributed to a deviation of the seasonality of 
sales actions from their levels in past years. Facing moderate 
demand, firms already announced most of their sales in 
December, when turnover is relatively better. Taking into 
account that the factors determining the pricing of the 
sector (exchange rate, imported industrial goods inflation) 
did not change significantly in the past months, we expect a 
further slow-down in the inflation of traded goods as the 
above-mentioned timing effect fades out . 
The price level of food has been sinking since mid-2009; 
however, December and January data indicate the end of the 
deflation period in this product group. Based on futures 
prices, a gradual increase of food prices can be expected, 
which might accelerate domestic food inflation, too. 
1.4  Trend indicators continue to suggest a low 
inflation environment
Chart 1-23
Indicators of underlying inflation*
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Chart 1-24
Inflation of market services and traded goods
(not seasonally adjusted one-month change, excluding VAT effects)
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The developments in vehicle fuel prices increased the 
consumer price index significantly; the base effect of the 
decline in prices at end-2008 played a dominant role in this. 
In the first months of this year we expect further price 
increases in this product group as a result of raising the 
excise tax and an increase in global oil prices.
Decomposing the effects of the most important factors 
influencing inflation, in the second half of last year it was 
clearly the government measures that caused the significant 
increase in the annual price index, although in the last 
months of the year growing energy prices also contributed 
to the increase in the price index. Excluding these items, 
inflation that can be deduced from basic macroeconomic 
developments declined slightly but steadily in 2009 H2. In 
the short term, with the fade-out of the aforementioned 
effects related to the altered seasonality of traded goods’ 
pricing, similar developments are expected to continue. 
Mainly due to the adjustment of market services prices, 
trend inflation is expected to continue to decelerate, while 
annual price indices may remain close to 6 per cent in the 
first months of 2010, as a result of global commodity price 
increases, the indirect tax measures entering into force in 
early 2010 and the correction expected in food prices. As 
the temporary price level increasing effects of the indirect 
tax increase in July 2009 fade out, the annual price index 
may decline considerably from mid-2010 on. 
In parallel with the fall in demand and trend inflation 
developments, inflation expectations continued to moderate 
in 2009 H2. In a regional comparison, estimates regarding 
domestic inflation expectations still exceed those of 
countries with a low inflation environment. However, early 
this year expectations rose sharply, the underlying reason 
for which may be the repeated increase in the excise tax at 
the beginning of the year, to which households’ expectations 
reacted more than average.
Chart 1-25
Inflation of processed and non-processed food
(seasonally adjusted, annualised quarterly change)
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Chart 1-26
Factors determining inflation
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Chart 1-27
Inflation expectations in the region*
(annual index)
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2  Financial markets and lending
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Since the November Report investor sentiment has had its 
ups and downs in the global markets, and the earlier 
dynamic upswing has lost steam. Major US and European 
stock exchange and commodity price indices have declined 
slightly, while risk indicators – and, hence, the volatility of 
stock index options and FX options in respect of major 
currencies – have risen somewhat. At the same time, most 
stock exchange indices and risk indicators have remained at 
a level seen before the Lehman meltdown. Advanced 
economies have been experiencing a period of abundant 
liquidity; yield spreads in the short-term interbank and 
government securities markets and LIBOR-OIS spreads 
were lower than they were in the autumn of 2007 at the 
onset of the crisis. Nevertheless, financial market conditions 
remain fragile with conditions aided largely by the surplus 
liquidity provided by central banks. 
At the beginning of the period under review, risk appetite 
was dampened by the debt restructuring of Dubai World 
and the downgrading of Greece. The fiscal woes of Greece 
remained in the focus of attention during the rest of the 
period. Though market actors find the government’s 
consolidation programme satisfactory, doubts concerning 
whether it can be implemented are widespread. 
Events in Greece affected global financial markets via a 
number of channels. Worries concerning Greece’s sovereign 
solvency and a bleak outlook on the eligibility of Greek 
government securities as ECB collateral led to a sharp rise in 
yields on government securities and CDS premiums. Political 
tensions in the euro area and the recurrent issue of the 
optimum currency areas added to the uncertainty surrounding 
the longer-term integrity of the euro zone. This is the aspect 
that contributed most to a significant, approximately 10 per 
cent fall in the exchange rate of the euro. Even more 
generally, worries about Greece shed light on the issue of 
sovereign debt, which grew during the crisis, and the risks to 
fiscal sustainability. This translated into higher risk premiums 
in countries with a higher rate of indebtedness, and this may 
become an important consideration in investors’ risk 
assessment. In the period surveyed the risk perception of the 
peripheral countries of the EMU and West European 
countries with higher sovereign debt also worsened. 
One of the reasons why the pick-up in the global financial 
markets slowed down was that, relative to the slow pace of 
recovery expected in developed countries, the earlier strong 
upswing in the financial markets could have been 
exaggerated and premature. An ailing labour market and 
subdued lending in advanced economies continued to pose 
a serious risk to the sustainability of economic growth, and 
the fact that some of the current favourable trends were 
attributable to temporary factors – e.g. stronger inventory-
building and fiscal stimuli to the private sector – bids 
caution. Based on the data disclosed since the end of 2009, 
recovery in the USA seems to be stronger than in Europe, 
which also contributes to a weaker euro.
2.1  Jittery sentiments in the global financial 
markets
Chart 2-1
Major stock market indices and the VIX index*
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Chart 2-2
5-year CDS spreads in EMU peripheral countries
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In the context of a slow recovery, central banks in advanced 
economies started to withdraw monetary policy stimuli in a 
step-by-step manner. Although key policy rates may remain 
at the current low levels for a longer period of time, the 
number of policy instruments has been reduced in several 
countries. Most of the Fed’s instruments providing 
temporary liquidity and introduced during the crisis will 
expire in February and March, and the asset purchase 
programme is also scheduled to finish in March. Both the 
Fed and the Swiss National Bank terminated the liquidity 
swap contracts that they had concluded with foreign central 
banks. The ECB held the last 1-year auction of long-term 
repo operations (LTRO) in December; the final 6-month 
LTRO auction has been slated for March. In February the 
Fed widened the difference between the Fed Funds rate and 
the interest rates of its credit facilities. Due to the surplus 
liquidity provided during the crisis, monetary policy focus 
is now shifting to liabilities-side instruments. The Fed is 
considering reducing excess reserves pumped into the 
banking system earlier by conducting reverse repo 
transactions and/or introducing interest-bearing deposits 
with maturity in the range of 1-6 months. 
Both global and country-specific factors 
contributed to the risk perception of 
CEE countries; regional effects remained 
moderate
International investor sentiment remained a major factor in 
developments in the financial markets of the CEE region. In 
late December and early January a benign international 
climate led to a rise in stock markets and FX markets; in 
contrast, the second half of January saw a marked decline 
due mainly to heightened worries over Greece. This trend 
was also reflected in the indicators of risk perception, i.e. 
CDS spreads and FX bond premiums, in this period. In 
general, considering the period as a whole, country-specific 
events resulted in mixed trends in stock market indices. At 
one end of the spectrum, there was an 11 per cent plunge in 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange index as a consequence of 
market actors’ speculative transactions in response to news 
of expected fiscal tightening; at the other end, stock 
markets in the Baltic States experienced a spell of marked 
rise. As regards FX rates, the picture is less mixed: emerging 
market rates depreciated mostly by 5-10 per cent vis-à-vis 
the US dollar. However, developments in the exchange rates 
of the currencies of the CEE countries vis-à-vis an ailing 
euro were mixed. 
Similar to last autumn, regional events did not have any 
significant cross-border impact in the period surveyed. 
Co-movement between the financial markets in some CEE 
countries was due to global factors. A deteriorating outlook 
regarding the IMF programmes in Romania and Ukraine 
hardly, if at all, affected the rest of the countries in the 
region last November; likewise, the improving outlook for 
the continuation of these programmes has hardly had any 
impact on the neighbouring countries since the November 
Report.
Global trends set a general course for movements in market 
indicators, and country-specific events proved to be 
important factors in financial processes in this period. The 
expected continuation of the IMF programmes after the 
general elections in Romania mitigated worries about the 
financing of the budget, which led to a significant fall in 
CDS premiums and market yields. Improved risk perception 
helped the National Bank of Romania to resume the easing 
cycle. Market optimism in Latvia was led by the Parliament’s 
approving a draft bill needed for the fiscal tightening that 
foreign creditors stipulated. Another favourable development 
was that the 2009 budget deficit in Estonia was low, which 
increases the likelihood of the fulfilment of the Maastricht 
criteria and the adoption of the euro scheduled for 2011. In 
contrast, country-specific events did not improve the risk 
perception of the Visegrád countries: CDS premiums 
increased slightly over the period. 
That the budget can be financed from the market to an 
increasingly large extent suggests recovery from the crisis. 
Stabilisation in the domestic bond markets continued, and 
the fact that there were also a number of long-term FX bond 
issuances during this period was a favourable development. 
Poland issued bonds with maturity of 15 years in an amount 
of EUR 3 billion; Turkey issued USD-denominated bonds 
Chart 2-3
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FINANCIAL MARKETS AND LENDING
with maturity of 30 years in an amount of USD 2 billion. 
Hungary and Lithuania also issued dollar FX bonds with 
maturity of 10 years in an amount of USD 2 billion each. 
Compared to other emerging regions, however, the fact that 
Eastern Europe had been hit harder by the crisis has been 
reflected in monetary policy cycles. While tightening cycles 
are expected to commence in the majority of the countries 
in Asia already in the first quarter of 2010, and in Latin 
America in the second quarter, they are expected to occur 
in the East European region only in the second half of the 
year. Since the previous Report, of the emerging European 
countries, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Romania, Serbia, 
Russia and Hungary have still been experiencing rate cuts. 
Global investor sentiment dominated 
developments in domestic financial 
markets
As in the past, global investor sentiment played a key role in 
shaping Hungary’s risk perception and developments in the 
foreign exchange and forint fixed income markets. 
Similar to the preceding months, the EUR/HUF exchange 
rate was trading inside the EUR/HUF 265-280 band. In 
keeping with a more bland risk appetite, the exchange rate 
weakened in early December and late January; foreign 
investors closed carry trade positions in the spot HUF and 
FX swap markets. In late December and early 2010 trends 
were exactly the opposite: foreign investors then emerged in 
the spot market as buyers, and the exchange rate strengthened 
to EUR/HUF 267. The exchange rate’s volatility was 
subdued and, based on FX option prices, indicators of 
forward-looking volatility were close to pre-crisis values. 
There was also some reduction in the depreciation-sided 
skewness of FX rate expectations. 
A slight deterioration in Hungary’s risk perception was 
reflected in a rise in the 5-year CDS premium of 
approximately 40 basis points. The default spread moved 
within a range of 200 to 275 basis points. Risk perception 
was shaped mainly by general global sentiment. Investors’ 
worries about Greece were reflected in a general change in 
global sentiment; events in Greece affected the CDS 
premium in Hungary to the same extent as in other 
countries with a similar risk rating. Favourable changes in 
the risk perception of Romania, Ukraine and the Baltic 
states did not generate any material change in Hungary’s 
risk perception. The relative position of the Hungarian 
CDS spread slightly worsened compared with a number of 
other countries in the region, which was attributable 
mainly to events in those countries. Based on market 
analyses, the overall favourable developments in the 
budget and external balances remained positive factors in 
respect of Hungary’s risk perception; in contrast, indicators 
related to marked external and government debts, as well 
as a business cycle that was weak even in a regional 
comparison, were negative factors. An increasing number 
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Chart 2-5
EUR/HUF exchange rate and skewness of exchange 
rate expectations in the direction of weakness*
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of comments refer to the upcoming general elections as a 
risk factor. 
Short-term yields continued to decline in the secondary 
market of government securities. Long-term yields moved 
fundamentally in conjunction with risk indicators: they 
increased by approximately 50 basis points in early 
December, which was counterbalanced only partially by a 
decrease in early January. Overall, benchmark yields with 
maturity of over 1 year rose by 13-44 basis points, while 
their short-term counterparts dropped by 30-32 basis 
points. 
 The volumes issued by the Government Debt Management 
Agency (ÁKK) during the period surveyed were similar to 
those in earlier months. Demand was uneven at the 
auctions; in keeping with changes in global investor 
sentiment, bid-cover ratios ranged between 1.02 and 5.75. 
Similar to earlier months, mainly short-term securities 
were issued. Higher swap spreads of longer-term 
government bonds indicate the lower liquidity of these 
instruments. No material change has been seen in the 
liquidity indicators of the government securities market 
since the last Report. 
Resuming the autumn trend, non-residents’ securities 
portfolio shrank in December, which was reflected in large 
volumes of sales in the secondary market and in bill 
maturities. Following a trough at the end of 2009, non-
residents’ government securities position strengthened. 
Non-residents were active at government bill and bond 
auctions, and also emerged as buyers in the secondary 
market. In late January the ÁKK issued an FX bond in an 
amount of USD 2 billion. The bond was offered at 265 basis 
points above the US benchmark bond with maturity of 10 
years; the spread – in conformity with risk perception, 
which by that time had improved significantly since the 
summer of 2009 – was much lower than that of the FX 
bond issued in July.
In keeping with trends in the preceding months, the 
interbank HUF cash rate was mostly in the lower section of 
the interest rate corridor. However, the rate departed from 
the bottom of the range in December. This was probably 
due to the widening of the interest rate corridor from ±50 
basis points back to ±100 basis points, which, in turn, is 
likely to have contributed to an improved liquidity of the 
interbank HUF market. The asymmetry in the utilisation of 
the O/N central bank deposit and loan instruments 
decreased. At both short and long maturities, HUF yields 
implied from quotes in the FX swap market was close to 
actual HUF yields at the corresponding maturities. In 
January, the MNB discontinued the CHF/EUR swap 
tenders. There had been no outstanding amounts since last 
August. The use of the MNB’s 3- and 5-month EUR/HUF 
swap instruments also fell behind the available volume 
significantly. 
The Monetary Council proceeded with the easing cycle 
which it started in July; however, reduction in the base rate 
was more moderate. The Council reduced the 2-week key 
policy rate by 25 basis points at its rate setting meeting in 
December and by another 25 in January; as a result the key 
Chart 2-6
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Chart 2-7
Future path of the two-week key policy rate implied 
from money market yields*
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rate now stands at 6 per cent. The interbank yield curve 
suggests that market participants’ expectations concerning 
the floor of the base rate cycle has not decreased further, and 
that the base rate is expected to stand at 5.5 or 5.75 per cent 
at the end of the cycle. Yields suggest that expectations are 
for a tightening cycle to commence at the end of the year.
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Monetary conditions have eased somewhat since the last 
Report. The real exchange rate weakened slightly, and the 
real interest rate continued to decline from the high level in 
July which was the result of a technical impact.7 In addition 
to the traditional indicators, the non-price factors of 
lending continued to play a key role in developments in 
monetary conditions. Strict lending criteria are expected to 
prevail in both the corporate and the household segments in 
the quarters to come. 
Decline in the real interest rate was due fundamentally to 
lower nominal yields on the one-year horizon; in addition, 
somewhat heightened inflationary expectations were also a 
contributor. Although, compared with earlier fluctuations, 
the real exchange rate has not changed significantly since 
November, this also contributed to the easing of monetary 
conditions. A 2 per cent weakening of the nominal exchange 
rate was dominant in the shift. The rate of inflation in 
Hungary and that in the euro area were not materially 
different.
2.2  Easing monetary conditions, strict lending 
standards
Chart 2-8
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At the end of 2009, processes in lending suggested significant 
deterioration relative to earlier expectations. In the fourth 
quarter of 2009 there was no turning point in lending; on 
the contrary, it contracted to an extent larger than expected, 
with the turning point itself drifting further away. The 
accelerated contraction in lending affected both the 
corporate and the household sectors. In the case of the 
corporate sector, consistently low domestic demand and a 
still high bankruptcy rate continued to dampen demand for 
loans. In contrast, more favourable external demand and 
lower interest rates could have had a boosting effect on it. 
However, for the time being the impact of the latter could 
not be felt. Although banks had not eased their lending 
conditions of non-pricing nature, interest on new EUR and 
HUF loan contracts already started to reflect lower funding 
prices. The loan portfolio of the corporate sector as a whole 
continued to shrink faster than earlier in the last quarter of 
2009. Measured cumulatively, the portfolio of corporate 
deposits declined slightly; as a result, trends in deposit 
collection did not have as sharp an outline as lending. 
Trends in lending to households also suggest deterioration. 
While the portfolio of only non-bank loans shrank in the 
first half of 2009, that of bank loans started to shrink as well 
in the second. The rate of shrinking accelerated in the case 
of both bank and non-bank loans, which led to a delay in the 
occurrence of an expected turning point in lending. Demand 
for loans remained rather subdued due to high employment, 
lower real income and a high debt service. In the case of new 
loans for house pruchase, EUR interest rates remained 
unchanged, while HUF interest dropped significantly in the 
last quarter. As a result, the difference between the two was 
below 3 basis points. This process only had a limited effect 
on the amount or composition of the loans already disbursed. 
What is especially worrying was that the rate of the 
placement of household deposits remained low at the end of 
2009. The portfolio of new deposits was much more modest 
in 2009 than a year before. This poses a significant risk to 
lending, preventing banks from adjusting their balance 
sheet, as a result of which banks have to curb lending even 
further. We expect contraction in lending to last longer. 
Corporate and household lending is only likely to pick up at 
the end of 2010 or in 2011. 
Trends in corporate borrowing and the 
placement of corporate deposits
The portfolio of loans awarded by domestic banks to non-
financial corporations shrank further by HUF 183 billion in 
the 4th quarter of 2009. This confirmed that the portfolio 
of corporate loans had shrunk to an extent greater than 
expected, and that a turning point expected to materialise 
at the end of 2009 was drifting further away. Most of the 
net decrease in Q4 was due to a slimmer HUF loan portfolio 
and, within that, a lower proportion of short-term loans. 
Interest rates on new loan contracts co-moved with the key 
policy rate. However, their level was still high above the 
interest rate on EUR loans. For the time being, lower 
funding costs cannot compensate for lack of demand 
attributable to weak economic performance. The share of 
HUF loans in new contracts for loans is not expected to 
2.3  A heavier-than-expected slump in lending, 
with a turning point drifting further away 
Chart 2-9
Net quarterly increase in corporate loans granted by 
domestic banks and the quarterly volume of 
corporations’ borrowing abroad 
–600
–400
–200
0
200
400
600
05
 Q
1
05
 Q
2
05
 Q
3
05
 Q
4
06
 Q
1
06
 Q
2
06
 Q
3
06
 Q
4
07
 Q
1
07
 Q
2
07
 Q
3
07
 Q
4
08
 Q
1
08
 Q
2
08
 Q
3
08
 Q
4
09
 Q
1
09
 Q
2
09
 Q
3
09
 Q
4
HUF Bn
–600
–400
–200
0
200
400
600
HUF Bn
Net flow, domestic FX-loans
Net flow, domestic HUF-loans
Net flow, total domestic loans
Net flow, foreign loans
Note: Credit institutions and the Hungarian branches of non-resident 
credit institutions. Net increase of the loan portfolio, seasonally unadjusted 
and adjusted for the rolled-over exchange rate impact. 
Note: Data on borrowing abroad are available until 2009 Q3.
Source: MNB.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • FEBRUARY 201040
increase materially, because, despite interest rate 
convergence, the difference between HUF and EUR interest 
rates is still too high to be able to increase the share of HUF 
loans. 
As well as real economic processes, banks’ strict lending 
criteria of non-pricing nature also contributed to subdued 
corporate lending. According to the MNB’s lending survey, 
although, relative to the previous period, banks did not 
tighten their lending criteria any further, easing is yet to 
materialise. As banks’ risk appetite had not improved, no 
turning point was experienced in corporate financing. This 
was also attributable to the fact that, except for a pick-up in 
external demand, there were no other factors on the 
demand side that could have boosted demand materially. 
This is corroborated by the fact that the banks included in 
the lending survey also reported unchanged demand for 
loans.
Companies continued to further reduce their deposit 
portfolio in the last quarter of 2009. It applies to 2009 as a 
whole that, measured cumulatively, the corporate sector 
slightly reduced its deposit portfolio. The annual decrease 
was the result of the withdrawal of HUF deposits, which 
was only partially counterbalanced by the placement of FX 
deposits.
Trends in household borrowing and the 
placement of household deposits
Household lending had also deteriorated significantly by the 
last quarter of 2009. Contrary to expectations that either 
there would be no change at all or there would only be a 
slight increase in lending, like the portfolio of non-bank 
loans, that of bank loans shrank quickly. Thus, contraction 
in lending will be deeper in this segment as well, and the 
turning point is drifting further away. The weak income 
position of households and a high debt service are likely to 
prevent a take-off in lending; as a result, contraction is 
likely to be deeper and more protracted than expected in 
this segment as well. 
Data on newly disbursed household loans also attest to the 
fact that lending to households fell significantly. It is also 
clear that it was the share of mainly FX loans in the new 
loans that shrank at the start of this year; as a result, that of 
HUF loans in the new disbursements grew. Increase in the 
share of HUF loans was boosted by subsidised HUF loans; 
conversely, the discontinuation of subsidies led to another 
fall in HUF loans in the second half of 2009. An increasingly 
Chart 2-10
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Chart 2-11
Trends in the criteria of non-price nature of loans to 
non-financial corporations in the banking sector
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Net quarterly increase in the loans granted by the 
domestic banking sector and financial enterprises to 
households
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high number of banks started to offer new benchmarked 
HUF mortgage loan products in the last quarter. Interest 
statistics on newly disbursed home loans revealed that 
ARPC on HUF loans had been converging to that of FX 
loans at an increasingly high speed. The difference between 
the APCR’s of the two loan types had dropped to below 3 
percentage points by the end of the year. If the price of HUF 
loans continues to decrease and that of FX loans remains 
unchanged, HUF loans may soon become a competitive 
alternative to FX loans, as a result of which the share of 
HUF loans in lending may start rising again. Later this year 
an increase in the share of HUF loans in mortgage loans 
might also be driven by a government decree on prudent 
lending stipulating that differentiated loan collateral limits 
should be applied (a 75 per cent LTV limit in the case of 
HUF loans, 60 per cent in the case of EUR loans and 45 per 
cent in the case of other FX loans).
Though the household deposit portfolio grew by HUF 102 
billion in the last quarter of 2009, this was rather moderate 
growth when seasonal effects are taken into account. What 
is particularly worrying is that the annual cumulative 
growth of the deposit portfolio (HUF 363 billion) was less 
than half of the corresponding 2008 amount. 
Unfavourable trends in lending to and collecting deposits 
from households and corporations restrained banks’ 
adjusting their balance sheets to a considerable extent. A 
dynamic, over 10 percentage point fall in the loan-to-
deposit ratio from a 160 per cent level in the first half of 
2009 slowed down and got stuck at above 143 per cent in 
the second. This adds to the risk that banks’ lending will 
remain subdued and growth of the loan portfolio will be 
permanently low. 
Chart 2-13
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Average ARPC on newly disbursed loans
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The more favourable economic conditions may accelerate 
the recovery of the Hungarian economy from the recession. 
However, due to the prolonged process of banks' balance 
sheet adjustments and pro-cyclical policy stance, domestic 
demand may continue to decline significantly even in 2010, 
which could result in a delayed and more restrained 
recovery process in Hungary compared to regional and 
developed economies. Substantial economic growth is not 
expected to take place until 2011. 
The upward revision in our CPI forecast was mainly driven 
by the higher imported inflation and a technical factor 
coming from the changes in the weights of consumer basket. 
However in line with our new real economic forecast the 
persistently weak domestic demand exerts a downward 
pressure on prices over our entire forecast horizon. 
Accordingly, the disinflation trend will continue until the 
end of 2010 and a pick-up in domestic demand is not likely 
to generate a turnaround until 2011. As a result, from the 
second half of 2010 inflation may drop close to the medium-
term inflation target, and from the end of the year it may 
continuously undershoot the target across the whole policy 
horizon. 
Overall, the changes of our basic assumptions result higher inflation 
relative to the November issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation. As a 
result of the cutting cycle, the central bank base rate has been lowered 
by an additional 1.0 percentage point, and it currently stands at 6.0%. 
The exchange rate of the forint is similar to our previous assumption; 
however, the USD/EUR cross rate has exhibited some strengthening, 
which somewhat increased the effect of rising oil prices. The slope of 
the oil price path increased slightly over our forecast horizon. 
Box 3-1: Changes in our basic assumptions
November 2009 February 2010
Change compared with November 
(%)
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
Central bank base rate 
(per cent)**
7.00 7.00 7.00 6.25 6.00 6.00 –0.75 –1.00 –1.00
HUF/EUR 280.0 268.7 268.7 280.6 269.3 269.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
USD/EUR (cent) 139.4 148.1 148.1 139.3 142.8 142.8 0.0 –3.6 –3.6
BRENT oil price (USD/barrel) 61.4 78.4 82.5 61.6 79.4 84.8 0.4 1.3 2.8
BRENT oil price (EUR/barrel) 43.7 52.9 55.7 43.9 55.6 59.4 0.4 5.0 6.5
BRENT oil price (HUF/barrel) 12,184 14,219 14,971 12,260 14,970 15,990 0.6 5.3 6.8
Table 3-1
Changes in our basic assumption relative to the November report*
* Annual averages, based on the monthly average exchange rate of Janury 2010 and the crude oil futures price.
** End-of-year values based on constant interest rate assumption, the change compared to November is presented in percentage points.
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According to the forecasts of major international institutions, 
expectations regarding global economic activity continued 
to improve significantly in the last quarter. The positive 
shifts affected mainly the United States and certain emerging 
countries (primarily China and India), while only minor 
shifts were observed in the case of the key export partners 
of Hungary (the euro area) compared to our previous 
assumptions. The improving external demand may persist 
during the whole forecast horizon. Growth of the developed 
countries has been bolstered by some one-off fiscal measures. 
As these measures phase out, the global economy is 
expected to slow down compared to the second half of 
2009. The developed countries’ fiscal stimuli have not only 
had an effect on the strength of Hungary’s external demand, 
but also changed its structure. Without an equal pick up in 
domestic demand, the phasing out of the fiscal stimuli 
would cause a decrease in vehicle sales, which plays a 
dominant role in Hungarian exports. This may result in a 
weaker increase in Hungary’s market share compared to the 
previous months. However, the impact of this may be 
somewhat offset by the effect of the real exchange rate, 
which is more devalued than in previous years.
Developments in household consumption continue to be 
determined by changes in real earnings, expected income 
path, the uncertainty surrounding these earnings and the 
lending activity of the banking sector. Income developments 
across our forecast horizon are predominantly determined 
by firms' labour market adjustments and government 
measures. 
While measures pertaining to personal income tax will 
generate significant excess income, this effect will be offset 
by other government measures (in particular the decline in 
cash transfers received from the budget and taxes imposed 
on cafeteria benefits), thus fiscal policy continues to be 
restrictive towards households in 2010. A further personal 
income tax easing expected for 2011 may become a major 
contributor to income expansion. However, possible 
offsetting measures taken by the government to balance its 
budget pose a significant risk to growth. While wage 
dynamics in the private sector may remain restrained over 
our entire forecast horizon, there will be a parallel increase 
in real wages in the context of a lower inflation environment 
from as early as 2011. Although the rise in unemployment 
may come to a halt in the second half of 2010, most firms 
are already hoarding labour and are not expected to execute 
any substantial staff expansion in the first phase of the 
recovery. As a result, the unemployment rate may remain 
persistently high across our forecast horizon. The generally 
high unemployment rate will increase the uncertainty 
surrounding expected income, which, through the increased 
role of precautionary considerations, may lead to a further 
strengthening of households' balance sheets.
The most marked shift in our assessment of the consumption 
path reflected our changed assumptions about the expected 
lending activity. Compared to our previous view – which 
3.1  Continuing decline in domestic demand 
hinders domestic recovery
Chart 3-1
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INFLATION AND REAL ECONOMY OUTLOOK
forecasted a turnaround at the beginning of 2010 – we 
expect lending activity to deteriorate further this year. The 
shift is explained by both demand and supply reasons. The 
restructuring of banks' balance sheets may last longer than 
we assumed previously, which is justified from the supply 
side by the banking sector’s low risk appetite, a weaker-
than-expected build-up in its deposit base, and a deteriorating 
loan portfolio. On the demand side, unfavourable 
developments in the income situation, substantially 
increased borrowing costs and the strengthening of 
precautionary motives may contribute to a weaker credit 
demand than previously assumed. Restrained lending 
activity results in poorer-than-expected household 
consumption over our entire forecast horizon.
Our projection about the private sector’s investment activity 
has remained unchanged. During the period of the crisis the 
corporate sector accumulated a substantial amount of 
unused capacities. Thus in the first phase of economic 
recovery firms may respond to an upswing in demand by 
increasing their capacity utilisation, while their investment 
activity may remain restrained. Despite of the better foreign 
environment this process may also be driven by persistently 
tight lending conditions. In line with the expected 
differences in growth affecting the upturn in demand, 
service sector investment may remain subdued over our 
entire forecast horizon, while the investment projects of 
industrial companies may pick up significantly from the 
beginning of 2011. As regards the manufacturing sector, we 
continue to expect a number of large-scale investment 
projects to be implemented (e.g. the Mercedes factory in 
Kecskemét). Reflecting tight lending conditions, a continuing 
decline in real earnings and sustained high unemployment 
rates, the significant decline observed in household 
investment in 2009 may continue in 2010 as well, to be 
followed by a slight adjustment only in 2011. Although the 
government is gradually reducing investment projects 
financed from own funds, the increasing efficiency of the 
disbursement of EU-funds may in fact contribute to an 
expansion of government investment over our entire forecast 
horizon.
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Household loan portfolio
–100
–50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
95
 Q
1
96
 Q
1
97
 Q
1
99
 Q
1
99
 Q
1
00
 Q
1
01
 Q
1
02
 Q
1
03
 Q
1
04
 Q
1
05
 Q
1
06
 Q
1
07
 Q
1
08
 Q
1
09
 Q
1
10
 Q
1
11
 Q
1
HUF Bn
–100
–50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
HUF Bn
Loans to households from other financial institutions
Loans to households from banks 
Total loans 
2008 2009 2010 2011
Fact Forecast Forecast Forecast
  Household final consumption expenditure –0.5 –8.2 –3.9 2.7
  Social transfers in kind –1.1 –3.6 –0.6 1.7
Actual final consumption of households –0.6 –7.2 –3.2 2.5
  Actual final consumption of government –0.3 –0.2 –0.4 0.6
Actual consumption, total –0.6 –6.3 –2.8 2.2
  Gross fixed capital formation 0.4 –7.0 1.8 5.0
  Changes in inventories 1.0 –4.7 0.2 0.0
Gross capital formation 4.8 –26.3 3.2 5.2
DOMESTIC USE 0.7 –11.0 –1.6 2.9
EXPORT 5.6 –9.5 5.8 9.0
IMPORT 5.7 –15.3 4.7 8.8
External trade balance of goods and services 0.0 4.6 1.2 0.8
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 0.6 –6.3 –0.2 3.4
Table 3-2
Our forecasts for the main absorption items of GDP
(annual change)
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Overall, our GDP forecast moderately increased for 2010 
and remained largely the same for 2011. The upturn in 
external economic activity may accelerate domestic 
economic recovery; however, in the context of declining 
domestic demand, which continues this year as well, the 
process may be somewhat delayed and less pronounced in 
Hungary. The decline in domestic demand this year is 
driven by the combination of an inevitably pro-cyclical 
economic policy and the subdued lending activity of the 
financial intermediary system. We maintain our previous 
assumption that substantial GDP growth cannot be expected 
until 2011.
Chart 3-4
Composition of GDP growth
–12
–10
–8
–6
–4
–2
0
2
4
6
8
10
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
–12
–10
–8
–6
–4
–2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Per centPer cent
Household consumption Public consumption
Gross capital formation Changes in inventories
and errorsNet export
GDP
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • FEBRUARY 2010 49
Firms are still intent on recovering the profit losses realised 
during the crisis mainly through labour cost adjustments. 
We expect this adjustment to affect wages, rather than staff 
numbers. Wage adjustments in the private sector may 
continue over our entire forecast horizon. This projection 
appears to be reconfirmed for 2010 so far by the OÉT 
(National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests) wage 
negotiations8, where a recommendation for a record low 
wage increase was adopted this year. The expected duality 
in demand developments can also be observed in the 
difference in wage dynamics. The deceleration of wage 
growth may be particularly strong in the service sector, 
while the upswing in export sales is expected to further 
accelerate wage growth in the manufacturing sector. 
Following an upturn in domestic demand, in 2011 wages in 
these two sectors may fall into line with one another once 
again. 
Labour hoarding moderated the growth in unemployment 
during the period of the crisis; however, this phenomenon 
also mitigates the expansion of employment during the 
upswing phase. Labour hoarding may continue to 
characterise the service sector over our entire forecast 
horizon, while employment in the industrial sector may 
slightly increase as early as 2011. As a net result of these two 
effects the domestic unemployment rate may peak at around 
11 per cent in the second half of 2010, to be followed only 
by a slight decline in 2011.
Chart 3-5
Unit labour cost and its components in the private 
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3.2  We expect sustained high unemployment
8 See more details about the role of OÉT wage recommendations in formulating the expectations of market participants in November 2009 Inflation Report, box 3-3.  
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Compared to the November issue of the Quarterly Report 
on Inflation, changes in our basic assumption and regulated 
prices would justify a higher projection; however, the 
impact may be partly offset by a stronger decline in 
consumption. 
3.3  Inflation may drop below the target from 
2011
The Central Statistical Office modifies the weights of representative 
items included in the consumer basket once a year, in January. These 
weights are formed on the basis of households’ consumption 
expenditure structure observed two years earlier, i.e. in 2008 in this 
case. The advantage of this method is that the consumer price index 
shows the inflation of the latest available consumer basket. Every 
January, the update of weights results in a one-off change in the level of 
the consumer price index, which would not happen if weighting 
remained unchanged. The update of weights usually does not result in 
any major difference between two consecutive years, but on some 
occasions the use of different weights may lead to a significant 
deviation. 
The weight of representative items is influenced by consumption 
behaviour as well as the price changes of products and services in the 
consumer basket. In the past 15 years, market services accounted for an 
increasing portion of household expenditures, while the consumption 
of traded goods and food declined gradually. The underlying reason is 
that households spend an increasing part of their income, which is 
growing in the convergence period, on services. The growing share of 
products and services with regulated prices was a result of the increase 
in the relative prices of this product group, as in the past 15 years the 
increase in regulated prices typically exceeded the rate of inflation. 
There was no significant change in the case of vehicle and market 
energy, nor with alcohol and tobacco aggregates.
The update of weights does not cause any major problem in a system 
that is gradually converging – presumably towards the consumption 
structure of developed countries. If a substantial shift occurred in the 
structure of consumption, the effect on the consumer price index 
Box 3-2: The effect of the update of weights on annual inflation
Chart 3-6
The effect of expenditure weight update on the 
consumer price index
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Per cent
Original weight Weight in the previous year
1995 2000 2005 2009 2010
Traded goods 30.9 28.3 28.5 28.1 26.5
Market services 16.5 19.4 21.7 22.2 22.5
Food 21.9 19.1 18.1 17.5 17.3
Regulated prices 14.0 17.5 16.3 15.9 16.7
Vehicle and market energy 7.1 6.3 6.2 7.0 7.6
Alcohol, tobacco 9.6 9.4 9.2 9.2 9.5
Table 3-3
Changes in weights of the main aggregates of the consumer basket
(per cent)
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Regarding pricing decisions, falling domestic demand is 
continuing to exert a significant downward pressure on 
prices in 2010. Consequently, we expect the disinflation 
path to continue this year for trend inflation. Similarly to 
the developments in 2009, inflation will decline primarily in 
the area of market services. Decelerating inflation in the 
service sector continues to be justified by both cost and 
demand side factors. The drop in domestic demand 
constrains price increases, which is already visible from the 
– seasonally important – first month of the year. This 
process is supported by the low wage dynamics, which is an 
important element of the sector’s costs. Wage adjustment is 
expected to continue in our whole forecast horizon. With a 
stable low imported inflation, prices of industrial goods 
may decrease further this year.
Futures contracts are pricing an increase in food prices, 
which is consistent with the strengthening of the world 
economy. Following the restrained inflation observed in 
2009 for processed food, we now expect a moderate 
acceleration, which puts upward pressure on processed food 
prices, too. In the case of processed food prices, energy 
prices are also inflationary above the impact from higher 
unprocessed prices. The weaker domestic demand will have 
an effect in this product group, too. However, the strength 
of this effect is expected to be moderate, due to the low 
price elasticity of food compared to industrial products and 
services.
However, domestic demand and the economy are 
expected to pick up as early as 2011. At the same time, 
output will continue to fall behind the level that would 
be justified by the available resources. The output gap 
remains negative even in the following year. Nevertheless, 
it is conceivable that as economic growth picks up firms 
will be able to support the recovery of their profitability 
through price increases as well, which may result in a 
general, slight acceleration of trend inflation compared 
to this year.
Based on stock exchange futures prices, in the context of a 
rebound in global economic activity global commodity 
prices are expected to rise. The increase in oil prices can be 
observed in domestic fuel prices with immediate effect, and 
could lead to a gradual increase in regulated prices as well. 
Regulated price inflation is also expected to be increased 
further by the abolition of retail gas price subsidies, and a 
hike in network charges in the case of gas and power.
INFLATION AND REAL ECONOMY OUTLOOK
would not be negligible anymore. In 2008, the price increase of energy 
items and the global financial crisis that erupted in the second half of 
the year affected households’ consumption structure to a significant 
extent. The decline in lending during the crisis reduced the demand for 
traded goods, particularly for consumer durables, so their weight fell, 
while the weight of energy items, having lower price elasticity than 
traded goods, increased in the consumer basket. 
The change in the structure of consumption affects the accuracy of our 
forecast as well, since we assume unchanged weights for the forecast 
period. As a consequence of the magnitude of the change in the 
structure of consumption in 2008, taking the updated weights into 
account, ceteris paribus, resulted in a more than 0.1 percentage point 
increase in our forecast for 2010 and 2011.
Chart 3-7
Change in consumption expenditures, retail sales 
and consumption of durable goods
(annual changes, current prices) 
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Trend inflation developments
(seasonally adjusted, quarterly growth)
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Expected developments in trend inflation will be reflected 
in the annual price index only after the temporary price-
increasing effect of the indirect tax increases has phased 
out. In the first half of this year CPI inflation may 
significantly overshoot the inflation target; however, base 
effects may drive the price index near to the 3 per cent 
target from July. From the end of 2010 this is expected to be 
followed by a below-target consumer price increase until the 
end of our forecast horizon.
Table 3-4
Details of our inflation forecast*
Weight 09 Q1 09 Q2 09 Q3 09 Q4 10 Q1 10 Q2 10 Q3 10 Q4 11 Q1 11 Q2 11 Q3 11 Q4
Unprocessed food 5.8 3.1 11.1 3.9 1.7 0.6 –3.0 3.3 6.1 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.4
Vehicle fuel and market energy 7.6 –11.5 –9.9 –5.0 5.5 20.1 14.9 8.4 9.0 2.6 2.2 1.8 1.4
Regulated prices 16.7 8.1 8.0 8.6 7.1 6.6 7.1 6.8 7.3 7.3 7.1 4.8 4.1
Core inflation 70.0 3.3 3.2 5.2 4.9 5.2 4.5 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.5
Consumer price index 100.0 3.0 3.6 5.0 5.2 6.2 5.1 3.3 3.2 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.1
* Aggregates are calculated by chain linking.
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In addition to our baseline scenario, we quantified the effect 
of three risk paths, which may have a significant impact on 
our forecast.
We continue to believe that the upswing in external demand 
is fragile. As the government support packages of developed 
economies run their course, the growth dynamics of 
demand in our main export markets may be even more 
restrained than last year. Accordingly, in contrast with our 
baseline projection, in our alternative scenario we assume 
that the economic recovery will be a prolonged process, and 
that GDP in our main export partners will continue to 
stagnate in 2010. It is not only through the sales of the 
export sector that the less favourable demand outlook 
affects the Hungarian economy. The more subdued 
economic environment restricts the rise in global commodity 
prices as well, while the risk appetite of the European 
banking sector may remain low over the longer term. In 
terms of domestic developments, these effects would lead to 
lower imported inflation and a more restrained domestic 
lending activity than we assumed in our baseline scenario. 
Overall, for the Hungarian economy this scenario would 
result in a weaker GDP path and lower inflation than 
indicated in the baseline projection.
Although our indicators estimating the developments in 
inflation expectations have gradually declined in the past 
six months, their current level continues to exceed the 
similar values of the countries in the region with sustained 
low inflation. This phenomenon may be explained by the 
unfavourable domestic inflation record and significant one-
off shocks, which continue to keep Hungarian inflation 
high. Although in the recessionary environment our trend 
inflation indicators gradually decelerate, as a result of 
indirect tax measures, regulated price increases and rising 
global energy prices the annual inflation rate continues to 
overshoot the medium-term inflation target significantly. 
Considering that inflation in Hungary has not resided 
around the 3 per cent inflation target for any length of time 
since the political transition, it is difficult to foresee the 
extent to which the inflation target can determine the price 
and wage-setting decisions of economic participants once 
the economy returns to the expansionary phase. While this 
risk path indicates significant upside risks in the inflation 
baseline scenario, it has a nearly neutral effect on the GDP 
path.
Our third risk path attempts to quantify the materialisation 
of the fiscal convergence path undertaken for 2011. To 
achieve the target, we assumed that it would not be possible 
to implement further reductions in personal income tax as 
promised and additional restrictions may be required on the 
expenditure side as well. In 2011 this would imply significant 
downside risks to the economic growth outlook, while its 
effect on inflation would be close to neutral.
On the whole, in terms of inflation the balance of risks is 
slightly on the upside, while in terms of growth considerable 
downside risks point to slower growth. The moderate 
inflation risks were deduced from the balance of the 
expectation and external demand scenarios, while in the 
case of growth both alternative scenarios – those focusing 
on external economic activity and the required budget 
adjustment – pointed to slower growth.
3.4  Inflation and growth risks
Chart 3-10
Fan chart of the GDP projection
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Chart 3-9
Fan chart of the inflation projection
06
 Q
1
06
 Q
2
06
 Q
3
06
 Q
4
07
 Q
1
07
 Q
2
07
 Q
3
07
 Q
4
08
 Q
1
08
 Q
2
08
 Q
3
08
 Q
4
09
 Q
1
09
 Q
2
09
 Q
3
09
 Q
4
10
 Q
1
10
 Q
2
10
 Q
3
10
 Q
4
11
 Q
1
11
 Q
2
11
 Q
3
11
 Q
4
Per cent
–3
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 Per cent
–3
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • FEBRUARY 201054
Table 3-5
Changes in our forecast relative to November 2009
2008 2009 2010 2011
Actual
Projection
November Current November Current November Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 5.2 4.1 4.1 3.0 3.2 1.3 1.3
Consumer price index 6.1 4.2 4.2 3.9 4.4 1.9 2.3
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 2.0 –4.6 –4.4 0.9 1.1 2.1 2.1
Household consumer expenditure –0.5 –8.1 –8.2 –3.0 –3.9 3.1 2.7
Fixed capital formation 0.4 –8.1 –7.0 1.4 1.8 4.3 5.0
Domestic absorption 0.7 –10.1 –11.0 –1.6 –1.6 2.9 2.9
Export 5.6 –12.3 –9.5 3.6 5.8 8.6 9.0
Import 5.7 –16.5 –15.3 2.7 4.7 8.4 8.8
GDP* 0.6 –6.7 –6.3 –0.6 –0.2 3.4 3.4
External balance2
Current account balance –7.2 –0.5 0.4 –1.5 –0.4 –1.4 –0.4
External financing capacity –6.2 1.5 1.8 0.1 1.6 0.9 2.0
Government balance2
ESA balance3 –3.8 –4.0 –4.0 –4.3 (–3.8) –4.2 (–4.0) –4.3 –4.3 (–4.1)
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 7.6 0.8 0.3 2.5 2.4 3.8 3.9
Whole-economy employment5 –1.2 –2.7 –2.5 –1.2 –0.8 0.3 0.1
Private sector gross average earnings6 8.5 (8.0) 4.4 4.3 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.9
Private sector employment5 –1.1 –3.8 –3.7 –2.2 –1.7 0.4 0.1
Private sector unit labour cost5, 7 5.4 8.8 8.3 –1.2 –1.2 0.4 0.3
Household real income** –0.6 –4.1 –5.1 –1.7 –2.7 2.0 2.0
1 From May 2009 on, calculated according to the joint methodology of the CSO and MNB.
2 As a percentage of GDP.
3  The numbers in brackets refer to the deficit achievable in case of total blocking of budgetary reserves. In our  forecast we have not taken into 
consideration any risk from debt assumptions. 
4 Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
5 According to the CSO LFS data.
6  According to the original CSO data for full-time employees. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the changed 
seasonality of bonuses. 
7 Private sector unit labour costs calculated with a wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
* The table contains data excluding calendar effects.       
** MNB estimate.
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Table 3-6
Our forecasts compared to other projections
2008 2009 2010 2011
Consumer Price Index (annual average growth rate, %)
MNB (February 2010) 6.1 4.2 4.4 2.3
Consensus Economics (January 2010)1 – – 2.9 – 4.0 – 4.5 2.1 – 2.9 – 3.5
European Commission (November 2009) 6.0 4.3 4.0 2.5
IMF (October 2009) 6.1 4.5 4.1 2.5
OECD (November 2009) 6.0 4.5 4.0 3.0
Reuters survey (January 2010)1 – – 3.5 – 4.1 –4.8 1.9 – 2.9 – 3.5
GDP (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (February 2010)4 0.6 –6.3 –0.2 3.4
Consensus Economics (January 2010)1 – – (–1.5) – (–0.2) – 0.5 1.5 – 2.4 – 3.0
European Commission (November 2009) 0.5 –6.5 –0.5 3.1
IMF (October 2009) 0.6 –6.7 –0.9 2.5
OECD (November 2009) 0.4 –6.9 –1.0 3.1
Reuters survey (January 2010)1 – – (–0.7) – 0.0 – 1.0 1.5 – 2.7 – 4.0
Current account balance (per cent of GDP)
MNB (February 2010) –7.2 0.4 –0.4 –0.4
European Commission (November 2009) –8.4 –1.3 –1.7 –1.8
IMF (October 2009) –7.8 –2.9 –3.3 –3.4
OECD (November 2009) –8.2 –1.6 –1.8 –2.6
Budget balance (ESA-95 method, per cent of GDP)
MNB (February 2010)6 –3.8 –4.0 –4.2 (–4.0) –4.3 (–4.1)
Consensus Economics (Janurary 2010)1 – (–3.8) – (–4.0) – (–4.5) (–3.8) – (–4.4) – (–6.5) (–2.7) – (–3.6) – (–4.8)
European Commission (November 2009) –3.4 –4.1 –4.2 –3.9
IMF (October 2009) –3.4 –3.9 –3.8 –2.8
OECD (November 2009) –3.4 –4.3 –4.1 –3.6
Reuters survey (January 2010)1 – (–3.8) – (–4.0) – (–4.5) (–3.6) – (–4.7) – (–7.0) (–2.8) – (–3.8) – (–5.5)
Forecasts on the size of Hungary's export markets (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (February 2010) 3.5 –13.2 3.6 5.4
European Commission (November 2009)2 3.3 –12.8 2.1 4.5
OECD (November 2009)2, 3 2.0 –12.0 3.5 6.4
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of Hungary's trade partners (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (February 2010) 2.0 –4.4 1.1 2.1
European Commission (November 2009)2 2.0 –4.4 1.1 1.9
IMF (January 2010)2 2.0 –4.2 1.3 2.3
OECD (November 2009)2, 3 1.5 –4.1 1.4 2.2
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of euro area (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (February 2010)5 0.6 –4.0 0.7 1.3
European Commission (November 2009) 0.6 –4.0 0.7 1.5
IMF (January 2010) 0.6 –3.9 1.0 1.6
OECD (November 2009) 0.5 –4.0 0.9 1.7
The projections of the MNB are ‘conditional’, which means that they cannot always be directly compared with the projections of other institutions.
1  For Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys, in addition to the average value of the analysed replies (i.e. the medium value), we also indicate the 
lowest and the highest values to illustrate the distribution of the data.    
2  Values calculated by the MNB; the projections of the named institutions for the relevant countries are adjusted with the weighting system of the MNB, 
which is also used for the calculation of the bank’s own external demand indices. Therefore, these figures may deviate from the figures published by 
the specified institutions.    
3 OECD did not publish any information about Romania, therefore Romania is not included in our OECD forecast.    
4 Data not adjusted for calendar-day variations.    
5 Aggregate based on Euro area members included in our external demand indices.    
6  The numbers in brackets refer to the deficit achievable in case of total blocking of budgetary reserves.  In our  forecast we have not taken into 
consideration any risk from debt assumptions.    
* Data from a special survey, which reported only the average of polled analysts' responses.    
Sources: Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (Consensus Economics Inc. [London], December 2009,  January 2010); European Commission Economic 
Forecasts (November 2009); IMF World Economic Outlook (July 2009 and October 2009); IMF Country Report No. 09/304 (October 2009); Reuters 
survey (December 2009, January 2010); OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 (November 2009).    
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In 2009 the declining trend of the ESA deficit came to a 
halt, and according to our baseline projection, the deficit 
may increase in 2010. However, if the budget reserves are 
unused, a deficit of around 4 percent may be achieved in 
2010–2011. Risks both from the macroeconomic 
developments and from those items which projected by 
experts point to a larger deficit. This implies that – even if 
we assume that the reserves will not be fully spent –, further 
measures may become necessary to achieve the deficit target 
this year.
In our Report we introduced a new indicator to capture the 
long-term component of the items shaping the fiscal 
balance. Our new, cyclically adjusted SNA-type indicator is 
more in line with the notion of structural deficit – which 
better captures the underlying economic trends –, as it 
attempts to handle distortions arising from cyclical 
fluctuations and the differences in statistical accounting. 
This approach filters out temporary effects from the official 
budget, such as subsequent debt assumptions, capital 
revenue from those returning from the private pension fund 
scheme or the effect of the early purchases of tobacco excise 
bands (labels) carried forward from 2010.9  However, for 
the sake of consistency, deficit is augmented by the other 
side of the story, e.g. quasi-fiscal losses incurred by MÁV 
and BKV and the self-reversing effect of excise bands 
purchases. Since the official deficit reflects a classic capital 
expenditure item spread out over time, PPP investment 
projects are also added to the deficit, otherwise there would 
be an unjustifiable difference between the public investment 
and the PPP-investment.
Despite more or less constant ESA deficit levels it is evident 
that the structural position of the budget improved 
significantly both in 2009 and 2010, by a total of 1.8 
percent of GDP. As it is difficult to predict the size of quasi-
fiscal activities, when preparing our forecast for 2011 we 
faced a challenge. Therefore we focused our efforts on 
estimating the determinations for this period. 
In 2009, adjusted for the effects of the business cycle and 
temporary, augmented items, a structural deficit of around 
3.9 percent is derived, which implies an improvement by 1 
percentage point, and can be considered as a more permanent 
improvement of the fiscal position. Changes in the ESA 
deficit in 2009 were negligible, which reflect the fact that 
the business cycle deteriorated the balance by nearly 2 
percentage points in itself, but it was offset by the above 
mentioned 1-percentage-point permanent improvement on 
the one hand, and the temporary measure of 0.7 percentage 
points on the other hand. 
In 2010, the structural position of the budget will improve 
further by 0.8 percent of GDP; however, the ESA figure 
does not indicate an improvement. The gap is explained by 
the continuing deterioration of the unfavourable cyclical 
effect; however, this effect is partly offset by the fact that 
the central bank's losses for the specific year will be 
reflected in the ESA accounting with a one-year lag.
Based on our current understanding of the determinations 
and projecting a constant ESA deficit, in 2011 the structural 
balance could improve by an additional 0.5 percent. 
Although cyclical effects on the items included in ESA 
appear to be unchanged, provided that our technical 
assumption proves to be true and there will be no new PPP 
contracts, the structural indicator may improve further as 
PPP investment projects – which amounted to more than 
0.5% of GDP in 2009 – will phase out completely by 2011.
While the EU funds significantly increase the level of 
revenues in the budget, the level of the government's 
investment expenditures – owing to the restructuring of 
expenditures – fall significantly behind (even including the 
PPP programs), which improves the level of structural 
deficit considerably across the entire forecast horizon.
According to our forecast, the ESA deficit may be close to 
the government's target in 2009 at around 3.8–4 percent, 
depending on the year in which the payments from those 
re-entering the public pension system are taken into account 
based on the ESA accounting.10 As was the case in our 
November issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation, we 
continue to assume that these revenues – which exceed 0.2 
3.5  Developments in the general government 
balance
9  There were no adjustments based on the augmented SNA deficit methodology to exclude income from the sale of the Kyoto emission quota and the VAT refund 
payable under the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. On the other hand, these two temporary items largely offset the effect of one another 
in 2009.
10  In addition, in 2009 the direction of a lower or a higher deficit is also surrounded by some uncertainty. The preliminary data pertaining to the general government 
in the financial accounts would be consistent, from the financing side, with a deficit of 4.0 percent.
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percent of GDP – will be settled in 2010, thus our November 
forecast of a 4-percent ESA deficit may prove to be true for 
2009. According to our baseline projection, the ESA deficit 
of the general government exceeds 4 percent both in 2010 
and 2011; however, if stability and interest rate reserves are 
cancelled, the deficit may stabilise at 4 percent. If the deficit 
path corresponding to the government targets achieved, the 
structural deficit indicator could in fact drop below the level 
of 1.5 percent, the medium-term fiscal objective (MTO); 
however, based on our forecast, further measures are 
required to meet the target. 
In 2010, as a result of changes in the macroeconomic 
developments and Constitutional Court decisions, the 
revenues of the general government may fall behind the 
budget bill figure by a total of 0.7 percent of GDP. 0.4 
percentage point of the deterioration is the result of a 
budget revenue shortfall generated by macroeconomic 
developments, while the cancellation of the taxation of 
property and family allowances under a court ruling 
translates into a shortfall of 0.3 percentage points. In 
addition to the differences on the revenue side, in our 
projection we assume a higher local government deficit as 
well as higher spending, such as expenditure overruns of 
budgetary units and chapters, and subsidies for the MÁV 
and BKV. All together, these items could generate 
expenditure overruns of nearly 0.5 percent. Local 
government deficit may be higher by 0.2 percentage points. 
In view of the fact that the budgetary units and chapters 
partly responded to last year's restriction by a temporary 
postponement of expenditures – i.e. the accumulation of 
carried-over appropriations –, we envisaged an overrun of 
0.2 percentage points in respect of the expenditures of 
budgetary units and chapters. Increased support to MÁV 
and BKV can be around 0.1 percentage point.
Effects pointing to a higher deficit level add up to around 
1.2 percent of GDP, a two-third of which is offset by various 
items, thus our baseline projection assumes a budget bill 
overrun of 0.4 percentage points. Savings in interest 
expenditures may add up to 0.1 percentage point, public 
pension fund re-entries could yield an extra revenue of 0.2 
percentage points, the effective blocking of stability reserves 
may reduce the deficit overrun by an additional 0.4 
percentage points, while miscellaneous items may further 
improve the balance by 0.1 percentage point. The 
cancellation of the remaining reserves (0.2 percent) would 
reduce the deficit to 4.0 percent, in which case the deficit 
would exceed the target by 0.2 percentage points only.
The budget currently contains four types of reserves: 
general reserves, special earmarked reserves, stability 
reserves and interest rate risk reserves. Based on experiences 
of recent years as well as the fact that complying with the 
determinations is a necessity, we may conclude that general 
reserves and special reserves are budgetary items and as 
such, they are likely to be incurred as actual expenditures 
and therefore are not suitable for managing risks. Our 
forecast assumes that 0.1 percent of the general reserves will 
be used to offset the aforementioned, BKV-related excess 
Table 3-7
Developments in the balance indicators of the general government11
(per cent)
2008 2009 2010 2011
Fact Prel. With reserves Cancelled 
reserves
With reserves Cancelled 
reserves
1. ESA balance*
Fact/projected –3.8 –4.0 –4.2 –4.0 –4.3 –4.1
Official target –3.4 –3.9 –3.8 –3.2 –2.8 –2.6
2. Temporary, augmented 
items**
0.0 –0.7 –1.2 –0.4
3. Augmented (SNA) balance 3= 1+2 –3.8 –4.7 –5.2 –4.5
4. Cyclical component 1.1 –0.8 –2.1 –1.9
5. Cyclically adjusted augmented 
(SNA) balance**
5= 3 - 4 –4.9 –3.9 –3.1 –2.6
memo: ESA primary balance 1- interest exp. 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.1
* In our  forecast we have not taken into consideration any risk from debt assumptions.
** We assume the full phasing-out of PPP-investments, this improve deficit in 2010 and 2011 by 0.3 and 0.2 percent, respectively.
11 Stability and interest rate risk reserves account for the difference between our indicators calculated including reserves and excluding reserves. 
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • FEBRUARY 201058
expenditure. Additional utilisation is expected to cover 
unforeseen expenditures (e.g. flood). Stability reserves (0.4 
percent of GDP) are intended to manage revenue risks, 
while interest rate risk reserves (0.2 percent) cover interest 
overruns. Currently we assume that the stability reserves 
were blocked in an effective way, since an unlikely level of 
tax overshooting was set as the condition of using them. 
Interest rate reserves will also remain; however, as we 
currently expect savings in this area, these reserves may also 
become cancellable, in which case only a slight deficit 
overrun may be expected. 
Based on the measures adopted thus far – such as the PIT 
reduction amounting to 0.6 percent of GDP –, the conditions 
are not in place for a deficit reduction in 2011. On the basis 
of previous trends, in our baseline projection we assumed 
that the growth in discretional expenditures would be 
slightly restrained in next year's budget and that the 
investment cycle of local governments would reach a 
declining phase. Since we expect the risk reserve to drop to 
0.2 percent in 2011, in the lack of additional measures, the 
cancellation of the reserve will not be sufficient to achieve 
the envisaged deficit reduction.
Macroeconomic and cyclical 
developments – the key determinants of 
the revenue side – have become more 
unfavourable for 2010-2011 than we 
assumed.
Although the highest fall in GDP was observed in 2009, a 
part of the cycle's negative revenue effect will materialise 
with a lag. Indeed, last year the negative effect of the cycle 
was mitigated by the composition of growth as wages and 
consumption – the items determining the main revenues – 
decelerated at a slower rate than GDP. However, the effect 
of the fall in revenues was only temporarily mitigated by 
this: in 2010 the deceleration of wages and consumption can 
exceed that of GDP. While we anticipated this development 
in our November forecast, our current expectations 
regarding the cyclical effect point to a higher decline in 
consumption and a somewhat smaller decline in wages.
In addition, we updated our assumptions about the effect of 
the business cycle to reflect the realisation of tax revenues 
for 2009. Overall, changes in tax revenues were in line with 
our expectations; their structure, however, proved to be 
slightly different than we expected: cyclical effects resulted 
in more favourable VAT revenues, while corporate income 
taxes fell behind expectations.12 Although such deviations of 
the two tax categories offset one another in 2009, both of 
them point to a more negative cyclical effect for 2010–2011. 
We envisaged that, in the context of a significant economic 
recession, corporate income tax developments would 
diverge from their previous trend, namely that they basically 
tend to follow changes in the nominal GDP. However, the 
reduction of corporate income taxes (CIT) by over 20 
percent exceeded our November forecast by a few percentage 
points. This may partly reflect a composition effect. At the 
whole economy level, while corporate profit is computed as 
the combined balance of profit-maker and loss-maker 
companies, CIT payments are determined by profit dynamics 
alone (the losses of loss-maker companies are carried 
forward). On the assumption that the negative effect of 
2009 would also continue in 2010 and would start to 
decline in 2011, we increased the negative cyclical 
component by 0.2 percent of GDP for 2010 and by 0.1 
percent of GDP for 2011, and reduced revenues accordingly.
Regarding VAT, in the second half of 2009 the level of VAT 
revenues exceeded our expectations. Since this trend is not 
explained by the changes observed in household consumption 
and retail turnover, firms' endeavour to sell from inventory 
may be an alternative explanation. Indeed, this activity does 
not involve a VAT refund at the time of the sale, as it has 
been refunded earlier, after the original purchase. However, 
the decline in inventories may partly be a cyclical process; 
i.e. parallel to a rebuilding of inventories this phenomenon 
may be reversed and lead to a shortfall in net VAT revenues. 
As a consequence, we had to supplement the cyclical 
component of consumption to adjust for the cycle of 
inventories. While this adjustment improved revenues and 
Chart 3-11
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12  While both effects are related to the cycle, none of them can be captured by means of the standard method of cyclical adjustment, which relies on the cyclical 
component of the major tax bases (wages, profits, consumption).
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the cyclical component by 0.2 percent of GDP for 2009, it 
decreased them by 0.1 percent for 2010 and 2011 respectively.
The ongoing improvement of the 
cyclically adjusted augmented (SNA) 
deficit largely reflects an increase in EU 
revenues and restrained primary 
expenditures
The cyclically adjusted augmented (SNA) deficit deems all 
expenditure cuts temporary in nature where quasi-fiscal 
expenditure occurred in reality, but it was settled outside of 
the government sector as corporate investment or as an item 
generating corporate losses. In a broader approach we might 
want to examine whether the actually restrained spending 
of budgetary units have a permanent effect or only a 
temporary one; however, the examination of this issue is 
outside of the scope of our analysis.13
EU revenues improved both the ESA and the SNA deficit in 
2009, because these expenditures financed by EU revenue, 
made possible to cut expenditures not financed by the EU. 
On the other hand, only the ESA deficit was improved – in 
a temporary way – by the outsourcing of expenditures into 
a quasi-fiscal spending (increasing PPP investment) and by 
one-off revenues (early purchases of excise bands, re-entries 
from private pension funds). The key factor in 2010, 
however, is a decline in primary expenditures, while 
temporary adjustments include one-off revenue effects (self-
reversing effect in excise duties and re-entries from private 
pension funds) and the significance of PPP investment 
slowly decrease. In 2011 the increase in EU revenues will 
offset the effect of the tax reduction. Although the spending 
of the EU funds will be reflected already on the expenditure 
side as well, the expected phasing out of PPP investment will 
reduce quasi-fiscal expenditures.
Risks slightly tilt toward a higher ESA 
deficit for 2010–2011
As shown by the fiscal fan chart presenting the risks, our 
baseline projection of the ESA deficit is somewhat 
asymmetrical towards a higher deficit in 2010 and 2011. 
The main determinants of the uncertainty distribution – the 
macroeconomic developments and expert items – both point 
to the materialisation of a higher deficit than expected in 
our baseline projection. This is mainly the result of an 
asymmetry around GDP in the macroeconomic forecast, 
which points to a lower growth. As regards expert items, it 
is important to note that our baseline projection includes 
the interest rate reserves, thus a potential cancellation of 
these reserves would automatically imply a downside risk to 
deficit. However, this is more than offset by the risk that a 
part of MÁV and BKV debts may be assumed, and therefore 
may be included in the ESA deficit.
Chart 3-12
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13  In 2009 the government exercised tight control on the expenditure side, and in our baseline projection we assumed that, for the most part, this would have a 
permanent impact. Although budgetary units slightly overrun their budgeted appropriations, but overall expenditure overrun became less sizeable than we 
expected. Nevertheless, since this partly reflects an increase in the stock of unused appropriations, we assume that the previously identified risks are still relevant.
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The external financing capacity of the 
economy may prove to be long-lasting
In the second half of 2009 the improvement in the external 
equilibrium position continued. Parallel to the real economic 
and financing adjustment accompanying the recession, the 
high current account deficit, which characterised the 
Hungarian economy in recent years, fell sharply; moreover, 
the current account balance recorded a surplus for Q2 and 
Q3. Indeed, households and firms spent less on consumption 
and investment than the shortfall in their incomes. In Q3, 
the year-long, dynamic improvement in balance resulted in 
a financing capacity of around 5 per cent of GDP (seasonally 
adjusted data). 
The increasing surplus of the balance of goods and services 
reflected an improving export performance. As opposed to 
the previous phase of balance improvement, export 
developments contributed positively to the increase in the 
external financing capacity in 2009 Q3. Parallel to the 
recovery in external demand, export sales increased slightly, 
while the import demand of the economy did not decline 
further. Although domestic demand continued to fall, 
filling up the gas storage facilities and the increasing import 
demand stemming from the rebound in export performance 
translated into a rise in imports. 
With respect to income flows, first of all it should be 
stressed that the interest income balance improvement 
observed previously came to a halt in Q3, which may be the 
result of a deceleration of the decline in external funding 
costs. Secondly, the deteriorating profits of firms in foreign 
ownership14 continue to play a major role in the continuously 
shrinking deficit of the income balance. 
Evaluating the external equilibrium developments of 2009, 
the pace of the adjustment seems to be even stronger than 
we expected. The rebound of external markets resulted in a 
higher foreign trade surplus in Q3. In addition, based on the 
data received thus far, the usage of current transfers from 
the European Union may have surpassed the level we 
expected in our previous projections. Therefore we reckon 
that the current account balance shifted into surplus in 
2009. 
 In the next two years the external financing capacity of 
Hungary may persist together with a slight current account 
deficit. We expect a further, albeit moderate increase in the 
surplus of the balance of goods and services, which may 
reflect a further fall in consumption and a somewhat more 
dynamic export performance. However, this balance 
improving effect may be mitigated by the slow rise we 
expect in the profits of firms in foreign ownership, which 
may generate an increasing income outflow as early as this 
year. Furthermore, the assumed graduation in interest 
expenditures may be a contributing factor to that. The 
steadily high external financing capacity may reflect the 
increasing usage of EU transfers. 
The remarkable improvement in external balance mirrors 
the abrupt boost observed in the financing position of the 
private sector in 2009. However, according to recently 
received data, net savings of the household sector were 
lower compared to our previous expectations, which may be 
in connection with the larger drop in the disposable income 
of the sector. In addition, in the background of the 
3.6  External balance
14  The figures of income flows related to direct investment are based on estimates in the preliminary balance of payments statistics for 2009. The estimate will be 
replaced by data based on corporate reports in September 2010.
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adjustment taking place, borrowing and financial asset 
transactions did not evolve in line with our assumptions. 
Decreasing incomes coupled with more subdued asset 
accumulation. Indeed, while there was a surge in bank 
depositing in Q2 and Q3, a substantial amount of government 
securities and shares were also sold. In addition, in Q4 
savings of the sector accumulated at a lower pace than we 
experienced in the same periods of the year in the past. 
Thus stronger liquidity constraints must have determined 
the developments in financial assets rather than the 
generation of precautionary savings. Along with this low 
level of financial asset accumulation, the borrowing of 
households was also below former expectations. 
Throughout 2010 the financing capacity of households may 
continue to improve. We forecast a decline in net savings of 
the sector only together with recovering consumption. The 
continued high level of the corporate sector's financing 
capacity may reflect a more favourable external demand and 
a gradually increasing usage of EU transfers. Accordingly, 
based on our current projection the financing need of the 
general government may be more than offset by the net 
savings of the private sector through the forecast horizon. 
Developments in financing – 
decelerating banking sector balance 
sheet adjustments
The banking sector's balance sheet adjustments and the 
decline in their external liabilities – both of which had 
played a key role in external financing developments in the 
first half of the year – continued regarding Q3 as a whole. 
Table 3-8
Structure of the current account
(As a percentage of GDP unless otherwise indicated)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Fact/Preliminary fact Forecast
1. Balance of goods and services –3.8 –2.9 –1.2 –0.9 1.2 0.7 6.6 6.8 7.1
2.  Income balance –5.0 –5.2 –5.7 –6.2 –7.5 –7.3 –6.1 –6.8 –7.1
3. Balance of current transfers 0.8 –0.2 –0.3 –0.3 –0.5 –0.6 –0.1 –0.4 –0.4
 I. Current account balance (1+2+3) –8.0 –8.3 –7.2 –7.5 –6.8 –7.2 0.4 –0.4 –0.4
Current account balance in EUR billions –5.9 –6.8 –6.4 –6.7 –6.9 –7.6 0.3 –0.4 –0.4
 II. Capital account balance 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.0 2.4
    External financing capacity (I+II) –8.0 –8.2 –6.5 –6.7 –6.1 –6.2 1.8 1.6 2.0
Table 3-9
GDP-proportionate net financing capacity of individual sectors
* In addition to the central government, the augmented general government includes local governments, ÁPV Ltd., institutions discharging quasi-fiscal 
duties (MÁV, BKV), the MNB and authorities implementing capital projects initiated and controlled by the government and formally implemented under 
PPP schemes. The forecast related to the financing needs of the general government does not include stability and interest rate risk reserves. 
** In our forecast for the ‘errors and omissions’ item of the balance of payments we assumed that the cumulated figure for the last four quarters would 
remain unchanged. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Estimation Forecast
I. Augmented general goverment* –8.3 –8.3 –9.4 –9.5 –5.8 –3.8 –4.7 –5.2 –4.5
II. Households 0.1 2.3 4.3 3.3 1.5 1.2 3.3 4.5 4.1
Corporate sector and ˝error˝ (= A - I.- II. ) 0.2 –2.2 –1.4 –0.5 –1.8 –3.7 3.2 2.4 2.4
A. External financing capacity, ˝from above˝ (=B+C ) –8.0 –8.2 –6.5 –6.7 –6.1 –6.2 1.8 1.6 2.0
B. Current account balance –8.0 –8.3 –7.2 –7.5 –6.8 –7.2 0.4 –0.4 –0.4
     – in EUR billions –5.9 –6.8 –6.4 –6.7 –6.9 –7.6 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4
C. Capital account balance 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.0 2.4
D. Net errors and omissions (NEO)** 0.3 –1.4 –1.9 –2.3 –1.6 –2.2 –0.5 –0.5 –0.5
External financing capacity ˝from below˝ (=A+D) –7.8 –9.6 –8.4 –9.1 –7.7 –8.4 1.2 1.1 1.5
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During this period along with restrained lending activity, 
the private sector's intensive deposit accumulation and the 
banking sector's derivative transactions,15 banks' reliance on 
external funds decreased. At the same time, from the end of 
Q3 the process of banks' balance sheet adjustment began to 
decelerate. Household and corporate deposit accumulation 
became increasingly moderate, thus the outflow of liabilities 
from banks came to a halt. 
Despite a substantial decline in banks' liabilities, net 
external debt declined only slightly. A contributing factor 
was bank's restrained external lending. On the other hand, 
the outflow of debt-type liabilities waas also moderated by 
the fact that – for the first time since the onset of the crisis 
– foreign investors purchased Hungarian government papers 
in excess of matured securities. At the end of the quarter, 
forint denominated net external debt16 stood at around 54 
of GDP. 
In the first three quarters of 2009, FDI inflow – which 
consists of new investment, reinvested earnings and 
intercompany transactions – declined significantly compared 
to previous years, which could be partly attributed to 
reinvested earnings. In the context of low corporate profits 
the level of reinvested earnings was also lower; thus in 2009 
they played a less significant role in financing. The 
substantial decrease in intercompany liabilities of resident 
firms was also a contributing factor. Although such 
transactions tended to be rather volatile in the past, the 
moderation of intercompany borrowings may have reflected 
the sector's declining credit demand and the shrinking 
financing opportunities. It should be noted that the 
unfavourable investment environment did not appear to 
influence new FDI inflow in Hungary. 
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Components of FDI inflow in Hungary as a 
percentage of GDP
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15  Most of them are forint/FX swaps; therefore, in times of significant fluctuation in the forint exchange rate, a co-movement of net derivative financing and exchange 
rate changes is usually experienced. In 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1, parallel to the depreciation of the exchange rate of the forint, derivative transactions considerably 
reduced the balance of the financial account through closed transactions and margin calls. In 2009 Q2 the exchange rate of the forint already strengthened, while 
the transactions related to derivative transactions reduced the dependency on foreign sources.   
16 Debt indicator calculated without intercompany loans and financial derivatives. 
4  Appendix: Evaluation of our inflation 
forecasts for 2009
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APPENDIX: EVALUATION OF OUR INFLATION FORECASTS FOR 2009
In line with previous years' practice, this year we attempt 
again to review the extent to which our projections for the 
previous year materialised. This type of analysis is intended 
to identify the factors which contributed to potential errors 
in our forecast, so that based on the conclusions drawn we 
can attempt to improve the accuracy of our forecasting 
models. As before, we evaluate our forecasts within the 
framework of a relative and an absolute analysis. In our 
relative analysis we compare our projections with the 
inflation projections of market participants, while the 
purpose of our absolute analysis is to decompose our 
forecast errors. 
When assessing the forecasts it is important to emphasise 
that those prepared by the MNB are conditional forecasts. 
We only have technical assumptions regarding certain 
variables relevant to our forecast (e.g. interest rates, 
exchange rate, global commodity prices, fiscal policy). In 
this respect our projections may not be fully comparable to 
the unconditional forecasts of market analysts.
Our first forecast on inflation for 2009 was issued in May 
2007. The inflation path for 2009 was subject to a number 
of significant shocks, often with conflicting effects. These 
were mapped remarkably well in our own projections. Up to 
November 2007 we expected inflation to be around the 
medium-term inflation target. Between February and 
August 2008, in the context of rising energy and food 
prices, we raised our forecasts above the 3 per cent target. 
The first time we could expect the effects of the crisis to 
materialise was in November 2008 – at this time, in 
consideration of the assumed disinflation effect of sharply 
falling demand, we readjusted our forecast to a level close to 
the target. The initial plans of a potential VAT increase were 
drawn up in February 2009 and we responded by raising 
our inflation forecast. In May 2009 we raised our forecast 
above 4 per cent in view of an indirect tax increase – which 
proved to be final – that was higher than the one in 
February. In August and November 2009 we slightly 
lowered our forecast, primarily in order to adjust for the 
lower actual figures resulting from the stronger-than-
expected disinflation effect of falling demand. This was also 
reflected in the weaker-than-expected carry-over effect of 
VAT.
Comparing the MNB's forecast to the median of the 
projections of analysts participating in the Reuters survey, 
we can note that they included nearly identical forecast 
errors up to 2008. However, from November 2008 we were 
more efficient in incorporating into our forecast17 all 
information relevant to the inflation path. Consequently, 
from November our forecasts reacted more quickly to the 
significant shocks on inflation and we managed to 
incorporate the impact of these shocks into our projections 
with less error. In the context of the crisis we projected a 
somewhat lower inflation in November 2008, and then in 
February 2009 we were quicker to calculate with the effects 
of indirect tax increases. It is also noteworthy that the 
standard deviation in the projections of market analysts was 
rather considerable in both months, which makes us 
conclude that the analysts incorporated new information 
into their forecasts gradually, rather than all at once. From 
May 2009 we expected a stronger disinflation than market 
analysts resulting from the fall in demand, and subsequent 
facts proved our assumption correct. Overall, the forecasts 
of the MNB proved to be somewhat more precise than 
market projections, which is confirmed by the fact that the 
mean average error (MAE) of the inflation forecast for the 
year 2009 is 0.44 of a percentage point for the MNB and 
0.52 of a percentage point for the Reuters survey.18 The 
more precise central bank forecast results are largely due to 
the projections prepared after November 2008. 
In the context of rule-based assumptions, when evaluating 
our inflation forecasts it is worth distinguishing the effects 
of certain basic assumptions (oil prices, HUF/EUR exchange 
rate) from those of other variables (economic activity, 
17  In November 2008 the MNB defined an inflation band as a forecast; for the sake of simplicity, we applied the median of the band for the purposes of our charts and 
calculations.
18 Calculated from November 2007, the date from which both forecasts are available.
Chart 4-1
Forecasts of the MNB and the analysts participating 
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wages), which are considered endogenous for our forecast 
model. 
As agricultural producer prices are also exogenous for our 
models, our treatment of them is similar to that of the basic 
assumptions. Inflation for 2009 was largely influenced by 
the VAT and excise duty increase in July 2009, and to a 
lesser degree by other government measures. The resulting 
forecast error should also be considered exogenous. The 
results are shown in Chart 3 and Chart 4. The forecast error 
is calculated as the difference between the actual and the 
forecast figures, from which we compute the remaining 
error by excluding the effects of the factors listed above. To 
some extent this error contains changes in the inflation 
effect of macroeconomic developments (labour market, 
economic activity) which were not anticipated in the 
forecast, and also includes the error of the model used for 
the inflation forecast. Thus the remaining forecast error 
adequately reveals the modelling error that we actually 
made. Consequently, in August 2008 for example, the 
forecasted inflation would have been around 2 percentage 
points higher than the actual figure proved to be if 
information regarding the paths of exchange rates, oil 
prices, measures and agricultural producer prices had been 
available to us.
It is evident that this error was significantly negative until 
August 2008; however, this changed and the error 
occasionally even turned into positive from November 
2008, once the effect of the crisis was incorporated into the 
forecast. Thus it appears that from November 2008 we were 
able to forecast the disinflation effect of the crisis basically 
accurately. At the same time, the significantly positive 
Chart 4-2
Changes in our assumptions about the HUF/EUR 
exchange rate and euro denominated oil prices
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Chart 4-3
Average inflation forecast error for 2009 and its 
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Chart 4-4
Inflation forecast error for 2009 Q4 and its 
decomposition
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APPENDIX: EVALUATION OF OUR INFLATION FORECASTS FOR 2009
modelling error observed in May 2009 is noteworthy, and is 
even more striking in the context of the decomposition of 
the forecast error for 2009 Q4 (Chart 4). Does this mean 
that the forecast we issued in May 2009 – excluding the 
effect of exogenous items – was too low? We do not think 
so; in fact it is apparent that, reflecting the smaller-than-
expected carry-over effect of VAT, the error resulting from 
the effect of government measures was negative. Therefore, 
if – based on previous experiences – we considered the 
difference between the expected VAT effect and the 
materialised VAT effect a modelling error, the positive error 
would be significantly lower. In other words, our overall 
assessment of the magnitude of disinflation was correct; 
however, we were unable to break it down properly into a 
decline in net inflation and a VAT effect.
Changes in our forecasts are also worth examining with 
respect to a number of endogenous variables relevant to 
inflation, such as household consumption and unit labour 
costs (Chart 5). Evidently, significant changes took place in 
November 2008, which prompted us to reduce our 
consumption forecast considerably. It is somewhat surprising 
that the inflation forecast we issued in November 2008 
proved to be reliable (excluding exogenous factors), 
considering that our consumption forecast continued to 
decline significantly during subsequent quarters. However, 
this may be explained by the fact that our unit labour cost 
projections progressively increased from February 2009 
parallel to the declining consumption forecast, which, 
ceteris paribus, put an upward pressure on inflation.
On the whole, we can conclude that, in addition to 
exogenous factors, our inflation forecast error for 2009 was 
predominantly caused by the fact that before November 
2008 we were unable to envisage the price reducing effects 
of the crisis. Nevertheless, from November 2008 our 
assessment of the disinflation effect of falling demand was 
basically correct.
Chart 4-5
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